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At a glance 
 
 The UK economy continues to outperform expectations with growth in 2016 of 1.8% and a 
consensus forecast of near 2.0% growth in 2017.  
 
 Scottish growth in 2016 is likely to come in around our post-EU referendum forecast of just 
1.0%. Recent business surveys have started to show a pick-up in activity although overall 
conditions are still fragile.     
 
 There remains a high degree of uncertainty around all economic forecasts at this time. In 
particular, the range of possible outcomes is much wider than normal given the number of 
‘big’ political events – not least the Brexit negotiations and the prospects for a 2nd 
independence referendum – that cast a shadow over the outlook. 
 
 The long-term implications of Scottish independence and the UK’s departure from the EU will 
be debated at length over the next 18+ months. Irrespective of the final outcome, the 
negotiation and referendum processes themselves will add an additional layer of uncertainty 
for business and act as a possible headwind to short-term growth prospects.  
 
 In such uncertain times, we continue to recommend that just as much attention is given to the 
range of estimates that underpin this outlook as well as our central estimates. Our central 
forecast is for growth of 1.2% in 2017, 1.3% in 2018 and 1.4% in 2019.   
 
FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector, 2017 to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Production 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Construction 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Services 1.2 1.3 1.4 
 
 
 
Forecast Scottish unemployment, 2017 to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
Unemployment  131,900 141,350 166,300 
Rate (%)1 5.0 5.3 6.1 
Note: Rounded to the nearest 50. 1 = Rate calculated as total ILO 
unemployment by total economically active population 16+. 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute  
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Summary 
Our recent economic forecasts and analysis 
of the Scottish economy have been set 
against a period of significant uncertainty.  
Political uncertainty is not unusual and for 
the most part, businesses and investors are 
used to dealing with changes in government 
priorities and indeed governments. 
However, the current level of such 
uncertainty is unprecedented. It is also 
different from normal in that the debates 
around Brexit and a possible further 
independence referendum concern the 
fundamental basis on which the Scottish 
economy has grown and developed over the 
last 40 years.  
That being said, with so little clarity around 
many businesses appear to be ‘looking 
through the uncertainty’ and are continuing 
to press ahead with day-to-day activities.  
Whilst the Scottish economy continues to 
lag the rest of the UK, a number of recent 
business surveys point to a welcome pick-up 
in activity toward the end of 2016 and into 
2017. 
However, consumers appear wary about the 
outlook. Indicators of Scottish consumer 
confidence are much more negative than for 
the UK as a whole.  
It would appear that this, and not just the 
challenges in the North Sea, is one of the 
key reasons for Scotland’s relatively weaker 
recent performance.  
On balance, we forecast that the Scottish 
economy will continue to grow over the 
forecast horizon and more quickly than in 
2016. The weight of probability suggests 
that it is likely to remain below-trend as 
policy uncertainties act as a headwind on 
growth.  
The Scottish labour market continues to hold 
up remarkably well. Employment rates are 
close to record highs, whilst the current 
unemployment rate of 4.7% is well below its 
long-run average.  
However with a rise in inactivity over the 
year, weak earnings growth and reduced 
average hours worked, the underlying 
picture is less positive than the headline 
figures suggest.  
Ultimately, whilst the policy focus will 
undoubtedly be dominated by ongoing 
debates around the EU and Scottish 
independence, it is important not to lose 
sight of the importance of domestic 
economic policies.  
Over the ten years since the start of the 
financial crisis in 2007, the Scottish 
economy has grown by just under 7% - 
equivalent to an average annual growth rate 
of 0.7% (less than a third of its long-term 
trend). GDP per head is just 2% higher over 
the same ten year period and the incomes of 
many households remain worse off.   
Strategies, action plans and ambitions 
around inclusive growth will only take us so 
far.  What really matters are clear practical 
policy actions to support businesses, boost 
productivity, attract investment and create 
jobs.   
A renewed focus on how both the Scottish 
and UK Governments can use the current 
powers at their disposal to support the 
Scottish economy is needed.  
 
 
 
 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
March 2017 
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Outlook and Appraisal 
 
Next month’s statistics are likely to confirm that the Scottish economy grew by just 1% 
in 2016. With growth of 1.2% in 2015, the Scottish economy has now been stuck in a 
low-growth cycle for nearly two years. With the triggering of Article 50, and plans for a 
further independence referendum, the Scottish economy’s resilience is likely to be 
further tested over the next year.   
Table 1: Scottish growth (%) by sector, Q3 2016 
 
GDP Agriculture Production Construction Services 
Q3 +0.2 +0.5 -0.1 -1.4 +0.4 
UK  
 
+0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 +1.0 
Annual +0.7 +1.4 -2.9 -5.8 +2.1 
UK +2.2 -1.7 +1.1 +1.7 +3.1 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Scottish economic growth – since 2013 
 
Source: Scottish Government  
 
 
Table 2: Labour market, Nov-Jan 2017 
 
Employment 
(16-64) 
Unemployment 
(16+) 
Inactivity 
(16-64) 
Scotland 73.7 4.7 22.6 
England 74.9 4.7 21.3 
Wales 73.3 4.4 23.3 
N. Ire 69.4 5.7 26.2 
UK 74.6 4.7 21.6 
Source: ONS 
 
 
Introduction 
The Scottish economy grew by +0.2% over the 3- 
months to September 2016.  
Whilst this was the first official GDP data since the 
Brexit vote, there is little evidence that the 
referendum was to blame. 
Indeed, the UK continues to beat expectations with 
the data suggesting that – if anything – the UK 
economy actually picked-up somewhat in the 2nd 
half of 2016.  
We expect Scottish growth to come in during 2016 
at close to our post-referendum forecast of near 
1.0%.  
The labour market has weakened somewhat, with 
Scotland now slightly worse-off than the UK on key 
indicators. On the plus side, this provides a degree 
of spare capacity to support growth prospects 
should demand pick-up in the months ahead. And 
overall, unemployment rates are near record lows.    
Most indicators suggest that the Scottish economy 
continued to grow – albeit at a relatively fragile 
pace – through the final months of 2016 and into 
2017.  
The improved near term outlook for the UK should 
help and provide a welcome source of external 
demand (Scotland exports around £12bn of goods 
and services to rUK each quarter).   
The outlook for Scotland will be shaped by a series 
of major political events over the next few months. 
On balance, we continue to believe that the 
Scottish economy will grow this year and next, 
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although the pattern of growth could be anything 
but smooth.   
Table 3: An improving global outlook – Growth Forecasts 
 
2016 2017 2018 
World Output 3.1 3.4 3.6 
G7 1.6 1.9 2.0 
US 1.6 2.3 2.5 
Euro Area 1.7 1.6 1.6 
Emerging & Developing 4.1 4.5 4.8 
China 6.7 6.5 6.0 
World Trade 1.9 3.8 4.1 
Source: IMF 
 
 
Chart 2: Recovery in Europe continues – economic 
sentiment on upward trend (> 100 +ve sentiment) 
 
Source: European Commission  
 
 
Chart 3: Commodity Prices projected to remain flat – with 
over supply of oil continue to support low oil prices  
 
 
Source: World Bank, Thomson Reuters Datastream  
 
 
 
The global economy 
After a relatively weak 2016, most predictions are 
more positive for world growth in 2017 and 2018.  
As with our own forecasts, there is a wide range of 
possible outcomes, particularly given the policy 
uncertainties surrounding the Trump administration 
and how major international players – such as 
China – choose to respond.   
The projected fiscal stimulus in the US is likely to 
propel it to faster growth in the near-term, but at 
the expense of rising interest rates (which will have 
knock-on impacts on emerging and global financial 
markets). More worrying are the long-term 
consequences of a rush toward protectionism 
which can only harm global growth in the long-run.  
The Chinese economy continues to move toward a 
more sustainable growth trajectory. How well 
controlled this is remains open to question. Amid 
heightened worries over debt and financial risk, 
tough new reforms are being implemented. Growth 
is projected to be at its slowest rate in over 25 
years. The potential for a sharper slowdown than 
planned, is a key risk facing the global economy.   
The recovery in Europe – home to over 40% of 
Scottish international exports – continues. 
Germany was the fastest growing economy in the 
G7 in 2016. And for the first time in almost a 
decade, the economies of all EU member states 
are expected to see positive annual growth in 2017 
and 2018. Major challenges remain, including 
ongoing painful structural reforms. At the same 
time, the current high levels of unemployment and 
low wage growth will take years to escape.   
Commodity – and in particular energy – prices are 
forecast to remain relatively weak over the medium 
term (and well below levels seen at the turn of the 
decade). Oil has stabilised at around $50 to $55 
per barrel: a price which is unlikely to usher in a 
new wave of investment to the North Sea. But with 
the fall in Sterling boosting profits (as oil is priced 
in dollars), it may be sufficient to counter some of 
the slowdown in activity provided that costs remain 
low and the tax environment becomes more 
favourable. 
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Chart 4: UK growth accelerated post EU referendum 
 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream  
 
 
Chart 5: But growth unbalanced – all coming from 
consumption  
 
 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream  
 
 
Chart 6: Consumption supported by higher household 
income – but increasingly reliant on savings and borrowing  
 
 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream  
 
 
The UK Economy 
The UK economy has held up remarkably well post 
the EU referendum. Growth has been close to its 
long-term average and if anything, the data shows 
the UK economy strengthening in the 2nd half of 
the year.  
In the end, the financial market volatility and 
uncertainty observed during the summer – 
including in key business surveys – failed to 
materialise into real economic data.   
There are a number of reasons for this, not least 
the decisive action taken by the Bank of England 
to shore up financial markets. Stronger momentum 
in global activity, higher global equity prices, more 
supportive credit conditions particularly for 
households and the first sustained rise in real 
earnings since the financial crisis, have all helped. 
Moreover, it would appear that with so many 
different scenarios now possible, many consumers 
and businesses have so far chosen to ‘look 
through the uncertainty’ and continue day-to-day 
operations as planned. How long this will continue 
with Article 50 triggered remains to be seen.  
As Chart 5 highlights, the source of the better than 
expected UK economic data over the last year has 
been robust growth in consumption. Indeed, 
household spending has been responsible for the 
entire net growth in the UK economy during 2016.  
Some of this reflects a pick-up in real household 
incomes. But more recently, a significant driver 
has been a drawing down of savings and an 
increase in borrowing. Indeed the UK savings rate 
is now close to record lows. This appears to be 
driven by improved expectations for the economy, 
robust house price growth in England and cheap 
credit.  
Whilst fuelling short-term growth, the long-term 
implications of such trends pose risks to the 
medium term outlook for the UK. In their most 
recent Economic and Fiscal Outlook, the OBR 
have run a number of different scenarios for what 
may happen to the UK economy should 
consumers quickly reign back their spending.   
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Chart 7: Inflation projected to continue to rise sharply in 
2017 
 
 
Source: Bank of England, OBR & IMF  
 
 
Chart 8: Actual and planned business investment show 
signs of weakness as uncertainty bites 
 
Source: ONS, Business investment in the UK & BofE  
 
 
Chart 9: PMI for UK remains positive suggesting a strong 
start to 2017 
 
Source: IHS Markit 
* Above 50 = expansion of activity, below 50 = contraction. 
 
Whatever scenario occurs, the outlook for 
consumer spending is substantially weaker this 
year than last.  
The value of sterling is around 18% below its 
November 2015 peak, reflecting market 
perceptions that a lower exchange rate is needed 
following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.  
A consequence of weaker sterling is that higher 
import costs will cause inflation to overshoot the 
Bank of England’s 2% target. Inflation rose to 1.8% 
in January and further increases are likely over the 
coming months. The Bank of England expect 
inflation to peak at 2.8% toward the end of this 
year. That being said, with significant uncertainty 
around how the UK economy might react to Brexit, 
the MPC appear reluctant to take any immediate 
decision to raise interest rates.  
Rising inflation coupled with moderation in pay 
growth as employment levels remains flat, is likely 
to mean materially weaker real income growth 
over the coming few years: another reason why 
consumer spending is likely to slow. 
Despite the depreciation in sterling, net trade has 
still acted as a drag on growth although it should 
have a positive impact – albeit modest – in the 
coming months.  
Unsurprisingly given heightened levels of 
uncertainty, actual levels of investment and 
measures of future intentions have weakened – 
Chart 8. Overall, business investment in the UK fell 
0.9% in 2016. Results from the Bank of England’s 
Agents of investment planning also remain low – 
although the figures did pick-up slightly in January 
2017.  
Despite these developments, the momentum 
established in late 2016, points to a positive 
outlook for early 2017. Up-to-date indicators of 
economic performance, including the IHS Markit 
PMI, remain above the cut-off of 50 which marks 
the boundary between expansion and contraction.   
The OBR predict growth of 0.6% in Q1 before 
slowing to 0.3% per quarter for the remainder of 
the year.  
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Table 4: OBR forecasts, Spring Budget 2017  
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GDP 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.9 
revision -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 
CPI Inflation 0.7 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.0 
revision 0.0 +0.8 +0.3 -0.1 0.0 
Unemployment (% 
rate) 
4.9 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.2 
revision -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Source: OBR  
* Italics are change from March 2016 forecast 
 
 
Chart 10: Revisions to growth forecasts – 2016: 2020/21 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Table 5: OBR forecast of nominal GDP (£ billion)  
 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 
March 17 1,964 2,029 2,095 2,168 2,251 
Nov 16 1,951 2,001 2,083 2,167 2,253 
Source: OBR  
 
 
Chart 11: Growth weaker as consumption tails off 
 
Source: OBR 
 
The UK Economic Outlook  
As highlighted above, the near term economic 
outlook for the UK economy has improved.  
Buoyed by robust consumer spending, most 
forecasters have revised up their predictions for 
growth in 2017.  
The OBR for example, are now forecasting that the 
UK economy will grow by 2.0% in 2017 – higher 
than their forecast of 1.4% made back in the 
Autumn Statement in November.  
But these improvements are short-term and largely 
superficial. Although forecasts have been revised 
up for 2017, they have been revised down for 
2018, 2019 and 2020.  
As a result, UK national income is projected to be 
essentially unchanged by 2020 vis-à-vis what the 
OBR had forecast in November.  
Most economists still predict that growth will slow 
over the next couple of years as the economy 
adjusts to life outside the EU.  
Overall, despite recent media attention on the 
positive performance of the UK economy post EU 
referendum (relative to forecast), the underlying 
picture painted by the OBR’s economic and fiscal 
outlook remains weak (and much poorer than 
before the referendum in June).  
Per capita GDP growth is forecast to average just 
1.2% over the coming years, well below its post-
war historic average.  
This time last year, the OBR forecast average real 
earnings would return above their 2008 peak by 
2020, but it now expects real earnings growth to 
be weak in 2017, and not return to the 2008-peak 
until 2021.  
Rising inflation is likely to make it particularly 
challenging for households exposed to rising food 
and fuel prices. It will also make it much more 
challenging for families reliant on working age 
benefits which continue to be frozen in cash terms.  
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Chart 12: Weak outlook for household incomes – 
particularly in short-term (0% growth in 2017) 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Chart 13: Short-term revision to UK Government borrowing 
forecasts, but medium term trend remains 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Table 6: Budget Consequentials for Scotland  
 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 Total 
Consequentials announced in Budget 2017 
RDEL 124 85 51 n/a 260 
CDEL 21 22 24 23 90 
Consequentials as % SG totals (Autumn Statement 2016) 
RDEL 0.47% 0.32% 0.19% n/a 0.33% 
CDEL 0.68% 0.67% 0.68% 0.63% 0.66% 
Source: HM Treasury  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Spring Budget 
Earlier this month, the Chancellor delivered the 
final Spring Budget. Alongside the short-term good 
news on the economy, Phillip Hammond was able 
to report a downward revision in borrowing for the 
year.  
But again, this is short-lived. The OBR predict that 
the government is still on track to borrow £30bn 
per year more in 2020/21 than it intended in March 
last year.  
With public sector borrowing forecast to be around 
1% of GDP by 2019/20, the Chancellor has some 
‘wriggle-room’ to meet his fiscal target (which is to 
reduce cyclically adjusted borrowing to no more 
than 2% of GDP by 2020/21). He may well need it. 
The forecasts are predicated on an improvement 
in productivity growth to 1.6% in 2017 and beyond 
– way above recent trends. 
The Budget was relatively thin on specific tax and 
spending announcements – and even thinner by 
the time the Chancellor u-turned on his decision to 
change the tax treatment of self-employed 
workers.  
He did announce an additional £2bn spending on 
social care in England over three years; some 
additional spending on education; and moderate 
further increases in capital spending on top of 
those set out in November.  
The subsequent consequentials for Scotland 
amount to £350m over the course of the 
parliament – £260m revenue and £90m capital. 
In the context of a planned real-terms cut of 
£800m (i.e. adjusted for inflation) in Scotland’s 
resource budget between 2016/17 and 2019/20, 
an additional £260m in cash is not an insignificant 
boost. But spread over 3 years it does not alter the 
conclusion that Holyrood will face challenging real 
terms reductions up to the end of the decade.  
If the UK Government maintains its ambition to run 
a surplus in the next parliament, further cuts 
beyond 2020/21 are likely – taking the period of 
consolidation to well over a decade.  
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Chart 14: Scottish vs. UK economic performance  
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 15: Average Scottish quarterly growth by time period 
(and by sector): Pre & post financial crisis 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, FAI calculations 
 
 
Chart 16: Decline in contribution of North Sea to Scottish 
GDP  
 
 Source: Scottish Government, FAI calculations 
 
  
 
Recent Scottish Economy Data 
In contrast to the relatively robust growth in the 
UK, the Scottish economy continues to grow much 
more slowly.   
Weak growth in any given quarter is not 
uncommon particularly as the Scottish series can 
be more volatile from time-to-time.  
But as Chart 14 highlights, there is little doubt that 
the most recent data is part of a sustained trend.  
We have now seen a year and a half of very muted 
(or in some Q’s, no) growth. The Scottish economy 
is believed to have grown by around 0.6% over the 
last year. To put this in context, average growth 
per quarter in 2014 was 0.7%! 
There are a number of drivers of these results. 
As we have discussed in the last two editions of 
the Fraser Economy Commentary, it is hard to 
move away from the conclusion that the on-going 
challenges in the North Sea are continuing to have 
a significant impact on the wider Scottish 
economy. 
Industries closely associated to the oil and gas 
supply chain, such as elements of manufacturing, 
have fallen sharply. Overall manufacturing is down 
over 7% over the last three years.  
To give an indication of the scale of the shock, 
Chart 16 plots the share of extra regio (which 
captures Scotland’s oil and gas output) as a 
proportion of total Scottish GDP. The latest figures 
show a fall from a peak of around 18% in Q3 2008 
to just 5% in Q3 2016. We cannot expect a decline 
of this magnitude not to have a significant impact 
on the on-shore Scottish economy.  
There is some evidence however, that the 
slowdown may not just be limited to the oil and gas 
industry.  
For example, food and drink is down nearly 2% 
over the year, the computer and electrical products 
sector is down nearly 5%, textiles and clothing – 
albeit a small sector – is down nearly 10% and 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals down over 8%. 
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Chart 17: Scottish vs. UK performance by sector over year 
to Q3 2016 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, FAI Calculations 
 
 
Chart 18: Construction output (nominal): New Work 
 
Source: ONS, Output in the construction industry 
 
 
Chart 19: Composition of Q3 2016 growth  
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
  
 
Overall, in only three of the major classifications of 
sectors – agriculture, water and waste 
management and businesses services and finance 
– has Scotland outperformed the UK over the year.  
Construction continues to act as a drag on overall 
Scottish growth – with the sector down nearly 6% 
over the year.  
As we first discussed in the July Commentary, this 
appears to be part of an adjustment back to more 
normal levels of activity. Construction grew by over 
30% between the start of 2014 and the end of 
2015.  
We remain somewhat puzzled by the scale of this 
growth – as the chart highlights the increase 
appears to have been driven by a significant boost 
in infrastructure spending. Whilst a large number 
of projects were delivered during this time, the 
speed of increase and subsequent fall-back 
suggests that some classification/reporting issues 
may be part of the explanation.  
The growth that does exist in the Scottish 
economy continues to be coming through the all-
important services sector (which makes up around 
75% of the total economy). In contrast to other 
parts of the economy, the services sector has now 
grown in each and every quarter since mid-2015. 
This is supported, in part, by relatively strong 
growth in retail and wholesale reflecting a 
continued robust uptick in consumer spending. It is 
also driven by a sharp rise in financial and 
insurance activities which are up over 12% on the 
year. 
All that being said, despite this relatively healthy 
performance in services, one of the explanations 
why Scotland has lagged the UK is because the 
UK service sector has been growing even more 
strongly.  
Over the year as a whole, UK services are up 
3.1% compared to growth of 2.1% in Scotland.  
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Chart 20: Expenditure components of nominal GDP – 
households remain most important factor  
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 21: Ongoing challenges with Scottish exports – 
falling manufactured exports for 6 quarters 
 
Source: ONS 
 
 
Chart 22: House prices remain relatively flat in Scotland – 
up just 2½% since start of 2014  
 
Source: Nationwide 
 
 
Similar to that in the UK, household spending has 
continued to make a sustained positive 
contribution to overall growth in recent times. 
Indeed, it was by far the greatest source of 
nominal growth in Q3 2016.  
Investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) fell 
back somewhat after relatively strong growth in 
Q2.    
The contribution from net trade was positive once 
again during the quarter but this comes on the 
back of overall weak performance.  
Statistics shows that manufactured exports are 
down 8% on the year. Engineering exports – which 
make up around 1/3 of total manufactured exports 
– have fallen nearly 14% since the start of 2015.   
Overall, Scotland’s weak export performance 
remains a concern and a key challenge for 
policymakers. Brexit, at least in the short-run, is 
only going to make tackling these issues even 
harder.   
Scotland’s estimated saving ratio remains low – 
and fell again in Q3 2016. If this reflects some 
households using up savings in order to support 
consumption, and before inflation and employment 
prospects become more uncertain, then it may not 
bode well for future growth prospects.  
It is unsurprising therefore that we have failed to 
see much in the way of growth in house prices in 
recent times. Prices are only up around 2% on 
2014 levels.  
This does however, hide a significant degree of 
variability across the country. House prices in 
Edinburgh continue to grow significantly, whereas 
Aberdeen and surrounding areas have been 
seeing much more muted growth (and even falling 
prices on occasion). In contrast, UK house prices 
are up 15% over the same period. Muted house 
price growth may have an impact on consumer 
confidence in Scotland.   
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Chart 23: Scotland’s Recent Productivity Performance 
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 24: Productivity still below trend 
 
 Source: ONS and FAI calculations 
 
 
Chart 25: International Productivity Performance (UK = 
100): 2015 
 
 Source: ONS and FAI calculations 
 
  
 
Productivity Statistics 
Since December’s Commentary, we have new 
data on productivity in Scotland.  
This showed growth in labour productivity of 3.5% 
in 2015. So have we finally turned the corner in 
terms of boosting Scotland’s long-term economic 
potential? In short, no.  
Productivity growth is fundamental to the long-term 
health of an economy. If we can produce more 
output (or better quality output) whilst still working 
the same hours then we will be better off.  
On a positive note, the gap between Scotland and 
the UK has closed. In 1999, Scotland’s labour 
productivity (in current prices) was around 95.8% 
of the UK equivalent figure whereas now it is 
99.9%. Productivity in Scotland is now around 
9.4% higher than it was in 2007 – although it is still 
well below where it would have been had it 
remained on trend (Chart 24). 
But the rise in productivity in 2015 follows 4 years 
of weak (and sometimes falling) productivity. To an 
extent, the increase appears to be a one-off 
bounce back rather than evidence of a sustained 
improvement.  
Furthermore, the UK’s own productivity 
performance remains poor. As the chart highlights, 
UK productivity is around 20% lower than the G7 
average (and well below the US, France and 
Germany). So catching up with the weak 
performance of the UK is nothing to write home 
about.  
At the same time, some of the growth this year 
appears to be driven – not from us producing more 
– but working less to produce the same amount! 
This is because hours worked fell in 2015.  
And whatever happened in 2015, we know that 
with growth in 2016 – on the measure used in 
productivity calculations – likely to come in around 
0.6%, and rising (or at least flat) hours worked, 
Scotland’s productivity is likely to have fallen last 
year rather than increased.  
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Chart 26: Employment & Unemployment: Nov-Jan 2017 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
Chart 27: Inactivity Rates: change over year: Nov-Jan 2017 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
Chart 28: Employment rate changes by age bracket since 
2007 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
  
 
The Scottish labour market 
With relatively fragile data across the economy as 
a whole, it is no surprise that the Scottish labour 
market has weakened over the last year.  
Employment is down 21,000 over the 12 months to 
end January. The Scottish employment rate of 
73.7% is just under a percentage point lower than 
the UK rate of 74.6%. But as Chart 26 highlights, 
the employment rate in Scotland is still relatively 
robust and near its pre-financial crisis peak. 
Overall, the Scottish labour market seems to have 
held up well despite the recent differences in 
growth rates with the UK.  
Indeed, the most recent data published in 
February showed a rise in employment of 16,000 
over the quarter with a similar fall in 
unemployment.  
One feature that continues to come through from 
the annual picture is that whilst unemployment has 
fallen sharply, this has been driven – not by people 
finding work – but by a rise in levels of economic 
inactivity – Chart 27.  
Our Scottish Labour Market Trends report, which 
we publish jointly with the Scottish Centre for 
Employment Research, provides a detailed 
analysis of developments in the labour market.  
One theme this quarter was to monitor how 
Scotland – and different parts of the country – 
have fared since the global financial crisis. This 
analysis highlighted that whilst Scotland entered 
the financial crisis in a relatively healthier labour 
market position than the UK as a whole, it has not 
bounced back to the same extent.  
Since 2007, of the different age groups, 
employment rates amongst older workers have 
increased – both in terms of those aged 50-64 and 
65+. This has not been the case for most young 
workers. This ageing of the workforce is likely to 
be part of a more sustained trend and raises some 
important issues about the long-term structure of 
the labour market, and the potential implications 
for young people seeking work.  
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Chart 29: RBS/FAI Business Monitor shows some tentative 
signs of improved conditions  
 
 Source: Fraser of Allander/RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
 
 
Chart 30: PMI: Scotland lags the UK 
 
 Source: IHS Markit 
 
 
Chart 31: Consumer Confidence remains negative in 
Scotland and gap with UK widening 
 
 Source: GfK Research 
 
 
Outlook  
There has arguably never been a time in recent 
history where the range of key fundamental 
economic policy questions facing Scotland have 
been so uncertain.  
How these issues – and in particular, the Brexit 
negotiations and prospects of an independence 
referendum – play out will have a material impact 
on the outlook for the Scottish economy. 
This is not to say that one particular outcome is 
better than the other. It is simply to make the point 
that with uncertainty of such a magnitude now in 
play, we cannot expect these processes 
themselves – irrespective of the end result – not to 
have an impact.  
This uncertainty comes at a time when some of the 
emerging indicators picking up business trading 
conditions have been starting to show a degree of 
positivity.     
For example, the latest RBS Scottish Business 
Monitor for the final quarter of 2016 contained 
some evidence of renewed optimism in the 
Scottish economy. The balance of firms reporting a 
pick-up in new business rose relatively sharply. At 
the same time, whilst those reporting a change in 
repeat business remain negative, it was up on Q3.    
The Bank of Scotland IHS Markit PMI for February 
reported that business activity in Scotland had 
increased at its fastest rate since July 2015. The 
figure of 51.2 is still below the equivalent figure for 
the UK but it does suggest that growth is picking 
up as we move into 2017.  
In contrast to the slightly more positive sentiment 
within the business community, levels of consumer 
confidence in Scotland have continued to slide.  
The GfK Consumer Confidence Index (where 0 = 
balance) fell to -18 in February. Well below the 
same index in the UK (which whilst also negative 
was -6).  
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Chart 32: Confidence negative across all income bands – 
although pessimism highest amongst low earners 
 
 Source: GfK Research 
 
 
Chart 33: Key driver of lower consumer confidence appears 
to be deterioration in expectations for economic outlook  
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 34: Fall in retail sales index – Q4 2016  
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
 
Unpicking the headline results, we see that 
confidence is weakest amongst those on the 
lowest household earnings.  
This may in part reflect their exposure to recent 
pressures on welfare benefits and higher food 
prices. Overall however, all income groups 
reported a negative result.  
One possible explanation for this outlook is the 
sharp fall in the expectations that households have 
for the economy in the foreseeable future. The 
Scottish Government’s own consumer confidence 
index points to a sharp weakening in expectations 
about the economy (Chart 33).  
Given the share scale of household spending in 
the economy, this loss in confidence does not 
bode well for future growth in Scotland.  
A useful ‘soft-indicator’ for labour market 
conditions is the IHS Markit Jobs Report. The most 
recent edition showed that 2016 finished on a 
weak footing, with falls in both permanent and 
temporary posts, but February was more 
promising. 
With such overall weakness in consumer 
confidence, it is of no surprise that retail sales fell 
in the final quarter of 2016 – albeit on the back of 
relatively robust growth in recent months.    
 
Table 7: Permanent Staff Placements 
50 = ‘no change’ 
Scotland 
Index 
UK 
Index 
2016   
Sep 55.2 51.0 
Oct 49.8 54.6 
Nov 49.1 55.6 
Dec 45.6 55.2 
2017   
Jan 45.7 54.5 
Feb 51.6 56.1 
Source: IHS Markit 
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Table 8: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy  
 2017 2018 2019 
Bank of England 2.0 1.6 1.7 
OBR 2.0 1.6 1.7 
NIESR 1.7 1.9 2.1 
European Commission 1.5 1.2 n/a 
IMF 1.1 1.7 1.8 
Oxford Economics 1.6 1.3 1.6 
ITEM Club 1.3 1.4 1.6 
CBI 1.3 n/a n/a 
Source: HM Treasury 
 
 
Table 9: Nowcasts for Q42016 and Q12017 for Scotland 
 Q4 Q1 
Quarterly Growth +0.42 +0.38 
Annualised Growth +1.69 +1.55 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Table 10: FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) 2017 to 
2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Production 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Construction 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Services 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Chart 35: Growth to remain below trend through forecast 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
* Actual data to Q3 2016, central forecast with forecast uncertainty 
for 2017 – 2019 
Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts at 
different forecast horizons 
 
 
Our forecasts 
Forecasting the immediate outlook for growth in 
these times of heightened political uncertainty 
remains challenging.  
Table 8 highlights how most independent 
forecasters predict that the pace of growth will 
ease over the next few years in the UK.  
Our nowcasts – which make use of a wide variety 
of data sources, including the latest business 
surveys – suggest that the Scottish economy 
remains on track to record growth in the first 
quarter of 2017. Growth of 0.4% would be higher 
than we have seen in recent quarters.  
In looking further forward, as in the past, we report 
a central forecast but calculate uncertainty bands 
to set out a likely range within which we predict 
Scottish GDP will lie. In our view, it is this range 
that should be just as much the focus of discussion 
as specific point estimates.  
In other words, it is entirely possible that the 
Scottish economy could grow close to 2% this 
year, but our assessment is that the probability of 
that happening is lower than our central projection.  
Two major judgement calls are required in making 
these forecasts.  
The first concerns the outlook for the North Sea. 
Recent developments in the global supply of oil 
suggest that there is little prospect of a return to 
higher prices in the near future.  
The implications for the oil and gas sector in the 
North Sea means that this is likely to continue to 
act as a brake on Scottish growth vis-à-vis the UK. 
However, after nearly 2½ years of retrenchment 
the impact at a macro level will start to be reduced.  
The second relates to any impact of the major 
political developments on the wider economy. 
Since the Brexit referendum, despite heightened 
levels of business uncertainty, levels of day-to-day 
activity have held up remarkably well.  
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Table 11: FAI revised forecast %-point change from 
December 2017 forecast by sector, 2017 to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
GVA +0.04 +0.05 -0.17 
Production +0.06 -0.01 -0.18 
Construction +0.02 +0.07 -0.11 
Services +0.04 +0.07 -0.17 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Chart 36: Contribution to forecast  
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Table 12: FAI labour market forecast to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
Employee Jobs 2,434,650 2,474,650 2,508,100 
% employee job 
growth over 
year 
+0.3% +1.6 +1.4 
ILO 
unemployment 131,900 141,350 166,300 
Rate (%)1 5.0 5.3 6.1 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
Notes:  
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
1 Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over. 
 
 
 
 
 
However, many businesses remain on edge. If the 
negotiations start badly then this could lead to a 
more serious loss in economic sentiment with 
implications for investment, spending and growth.  
At the same time, we await how businesses will 
react in Scotland to the prospects of a 2nd 
independence referendum.  
The next 3 years – 2017, 2018 & 2019 
Our central forecast is for growth to remain at 
around the same pace in 2017 as in 2016 – with 
growth of 1.2% (up on our December forecast of 
1.1%).  
We have broadly maintained our forecast of 
growth of 1.3% growth in 2018 but revised down 
slightly our outlook for 2019 to 1.4% (down from 
1.6% in December). These revisions are driven, in 
part, by the new weaker projections for the UK 
economy which in turn spill-over into Scotland 
through the strong trade linkages.  
Whilst positive, the outlook remains fragile and 
well below trend. The service sector will remain the 
dominant source of growth.   
On the components of demand, we expect the 
heightened uncertainty to dampen investment this 
year. Some of this will reflect delayed plans as 
firms await the details of the Brexit negotiations. 
Once this is resolved, a pick-up is likely toward the 
end of the forecast period. As the greatest 
component of GDP, consumption will remain the 
biggest contributor, although it will be lower than it 
otherwise would have been as higher inflation, 
combined with low earnings growth, feeds through 
to household spending.  
Net exports will continue to benefit from the 
depreciation in Sterling as will tourism.   
We expect unemployment to return toward a level 
consistent with medium-term trends (although still 
well below its long-term average). As we 
highlighted above, recent unemployment numbers 
have been skewed by a sharp rise in inactivity. To 
the extent that this is reversed, Scotland’s 
unemployment rate could rise much more sharply.  
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Diagram 1: Independence macroeconomic issues  
 
Table 13: The currency options 
£  Formal currency union 
 Informal currency union (Sterlingisation) 
Scottish £ Pegged to UK£ or basket of currencies 
 Floating 
Euro Formal currency union 
Source: FAI 
 
 
Chart 37: Scotland’s North Sea Revenues 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, GERS, OBR and FAI calculations 
 
 
Chart 38: Scotland’s estimated net borrowing 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, GERS 
 
Policy Context 
On 13th March, the First Minister announced plans 
to hold a second independence referendum. The 
UK Government has so far rejected the timing of 
any vote, but it seems increasingly likely that one 
will be held at some point.  
It is clear that the economic arguments will – once 
again – dominate the debate.  
The key issues are well known. In the coming 
months, the Scottish Government will need to set 
out a robust macroeconomic framework covering 
the key areas of: monetary policy & currency, 
financial regulation (including contingency for its 
banks) and fiscal policy (and crucially, the 
management of any borrowing and debt that 
Scotland would inherit).  
We will return to each of these areas in greater 
depth in future work. We will shortly be providing 
details of a series of public events looking at the 
economic choices now facing Scotland.   
Whilst the key issues are clear, the arguments this 
time are likely to be different.  
Firstly, in 2014 there was a clear choice between a 
‘status quo’ – albeit with more devolved powers – 
and independence. With Brexit, the debate will be 
set against the backdrop of two types of economic 
change. 
Secondly, it is undoubtedly the case that the 
recent challenges in the North Sea poses a 
challenge to any transition to independence. For 
example, the sharp fall in oil prices has 
significantly lowered North Sea tax revenues.  
Forecasts are now in the order of hundreds of 
millions rather than billions of £’s. Given its 
maturity, the UKCS is unlikely to be a rich source 
of tax revenue in the years ahead.  This has led to 
a weakening in Scotland’s estimated fiscal position 
– according to GERS – with the deficit in 2015-16 
around 9.5%. Assuming similar levels of growth 
and current patterns of public spending, our own 
projections suggest that the deficit will remain in 
the 6% to 7% range by 2020.  
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Table 14: Scotland’s GDP Per Capita 
 2015 GDP per 
head ($PPP) 
Rank 
Luxembourg* 102,131 1 
Ireland* 68,481 2 
Switzerland 62,500 3 
Norway 62,025 4 
United States 56,066 5 
Netherlands 49,570 6 
Austria 49,440 7 
Denmark 48,994 8 
Germany 47,999 9 
Sweden 47,823 10 
Scotland (geo. share of oil) 42,372  
UK 41,779 16 
Scotland (pop. share of oil) 40,001  
Source: OECD, Scottish Government & FAI calculations 
* Interpreting GDP per head figures is fraught with difficulty – 
particularly for countries such as Lux/Ire where statistics of what 
they produce differs from actual income.  
 
 
Chart 39: Devolved tax powers – but are they enough? 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, GERS 
 
 
Chart 40: Scottish export markets 
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
GERS tells us little about the long-term public 
finances of an independent Scotland given that, by 
definition, it is based upon estimates of public 
spending and revenue in Scotland as part of the 
UK. That being said, the Scottish Government will 
be required to set out a clear plan for how it 
intends to manage the very challenging starting 
position set out in GERS.  
Thirdly, many of those on the ‘yes’ side in 2014 
argued that there would be a degree of continuity 
between the then status quo and independence; 
e.g. plans to keep sterling, existing financial 
regulations and for both to be members of the EU.  
Now though, the Scottish Government’s case 
appears to be framed around Scotland pro-actively 
taking a different path to the UK (e.g. on EU). This 
being the case, it is possible that the economic 
proposition could be more radical on issues such 
as currency, financial regulation and fiscal policy.  
The Scottish Government will undoubtedly make 
the case that Scotland is an advanced economy 
and comparable in size to other successful 
countries but that the levers of independence 
provide an opportunity to do things differently. The 
UK Government will counter that Scotland now has 
substantial economic powers, and gains from an 
established macroeconomic structure and the 
pooling of resources across the UK.  
The trigger for the referendum was, in the First 
Minister’s view, the decision of the UK 
Government to seek a so-called ‘hard’ Brexit.  
Our own work has shown that EU membership is 
indeed very important for Scotland and Brexit will 
no doubt act as a key long-term headwind to 
growth prospects across the whole of the UK. As 
Chart 40 highlights however, Scotland’s trade with 
the rest of the UK is over four times larger than 
trade with the EU so a clear strategy for supporting 
trade with the UK will be crucial.  
As highlighted above, even under favourable trade 
regimes, Scotland’s export performance has been 
unspectacular in recent years. Any change which 
makes trade more difficult will only make this 
worse.    
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Chart 41: Scotland and rUK’s population projections 
 
 
 Source: ONS 
 
Chart 42: UK economic policy uncertainty based upon 
newspaper articles of policy uncertainty 
 
 Source: www.policyuncertainty.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration is also likely to feature in the debate. 
Historically population growth in Scotland has 
been far below that of the UK and other European 
countries with a similar population to Scotland.   
As Chart 41 shows, even with current projections 
for migration, Scotland’s working age population is 
projected to decline over the next few decades. If a 
‘hard Brexit’ was to limit the number of people 
coming to Scotland, the consequences for the 
economy and public services could be significant.   
In 2014, the case was made for Scotland to remain 
in a formal currency union with the UK. Whether 
this is the best option in the long-run and whether 
or not the UK would agree to it, is open to debate.  
That being said, the challenges with implementing 
a new currency – including any redenomination of 
contracts, investments and mortgages, the 
capitalisation of banks and managing any market 
volatility – should not be underestimated. All of 
which would also need to be set in the context of a 
stable and credible macroeconomic framework. 
Whatever the views are over the long-term risks 
and opportunities from independence, it is clear 
that we are entering an unprecedented period of 
political and economic uncertainty. With an 
economy struggling with the effects of a low oil 
price, the uncertainty caused by ongoing Brexit 
negotiations and a second independence 
referendum is likely to act as a further headwind 
for many businesses and potential investors.  
Just as it is the responsibility of the UK 
Government to provide clarity through the Brexit 
process, it is incumbent on the Scottish 
Government to do likewise around independence 
and to re-double their efforts to support the 
Scottish economy through these unprecedented 
times.  
 
For regular analysis on the Scottish economy and public finances please see our blog: 
www.fraserofallander.org 
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Special issue: Competitive tendering and Scottish 
lifeline ferry services 
 
Introduction:   
In early June 2016, an ESRC-funded workshop took place at the University of Glasgow to 
consider the use of competitive tendering for public services and some of the unintended 
consequences which arise from its use.  The workshop was attended by academic 
economists and lawyers, policymakers and trades unionists from Scotland and elsewhere 
in Europe and specifically focussed on the Scottish ferry industry.1 
The discussions which took place that day focused on the use of competitive tendering for 
the provision of ‘lifeline’ ferry services in Scotland and centred round the following 
questions: 
 What are the conditions required to ensure competitive tendering for lifeline 
services will provide an efficient service?   
 Does tendering lead to a more sustainable service both economically and 
environmentally?  
 In the context of lifeline services, what are the comparative advantages of 
competitive tendering over monopoly provision combined with adequate 
regulation?  
 What are the unintended consequences of competitive tendering on local 
communities reliant on the provision of lifeline services? Does EU competition law 
adequately account for situations in which competitive tendering has unintended 
consequences on local communities such as loss of employment and strategic 
capacity?  
 Can enhanced local community involvement alleviate the limitations of monopoly 
provision by ensuring the long-term sustainability of service provision?  
 How can ‘effectiveness’ be measured from the perspective of local communities 
and the affected workforce?  
 What are the existing templates of permitted negotiated agreements in EU law that 
account for the unintended consequences of competitive tendering? 
 
This special issue continues and develops that discussion in the light of the Brexit vote of 
23rd June 2016 and the decision taken by the Scottish Government in February 2017 to 
delay the Gourock-Dunoon ferry tender and extend the Northern Isles contract2 for a year 
                                                          
1 http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/business/newsandevents/events/archive/headline_460370_en.html  
2 http://www.orcadian.co.uk/north-isles-ferry-tender-reviewed/  
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while investigating whether or not existing EU rules would allow the Government to take the 
entire service ‘in-house’ and thereby dispense with the need to tender it in future.  The 
anticipated changes in the policy and legal landscape mean that some of the matters 
discussed here relate to interim arrangements or are conditional on certain states of the 
world coming to pass.  There is no certainty as to when the necessity to comply with EU 
regulations regarding State Aid will cease and, in any event, the recently-updated Public 
Procurement regime, which will then apply, is currently modelled on EU regulations.  
Therefore, it may be some considerable time before the way that lifeline ferry services in 
Scotland are provided and financed will change.  Notwithstanding this, there is a necessity 
to continue the discussion between academics, policymakers, trades unionists and other 
citizen stakeholders in preparation for a time when change becomes possible. 
Given the nature of the unintended consequences discussed here, it is clear that this 
discussion – and the wider public procurement debate – falls squarely within the terms of 
the Scottish Government’s Economic Strategy, in particular, inclusive growth, one of the 
Four Priorities.  The impact of ferries  - and the arrangements for their provision and 
financing - on fragile island economies; the employment impacts – both in terms of 
numbers and in terms of quality of employment opportunities – on these same economies 
as well as the mainland; the environmental sustainability of ferries and the way in which 
tendering can cut across this vital policy objective; are all necessary considerations within 
the over-arching theme of inclusive growth i.e. promoting both growth and greater equality. 
In this Special Issue, Irish lawyer, John Temple Lang, a former Director in the EU’s 
Competition Directorate outlines the ‘space’ within the existing regulations that allow these 
factors to be taken into account. Patricia Findlay, the leading expert on fair work in Scotland 
discusses the levers which procurement creates for government to encourage firms to 
adopt fair work practices.  Nishatabbas Rehmatulla, of University College London’s Energy 
Institute, an expert on environmental issues relating to shipping, discusses the potential 
inconsistencies between competitive tendering and environmental concerns, while 
economist, Neil Kay, a long-time commentator on the Scottish ferry scene highlights a 
possible existing infringement of EU competition law in relation to the self-financing of 
Scottish ports.  Finally, academic lawyer, Dania Thomas and I set out the range of 
possibilities in terms of the statutory framework for ferry provision as we move into the 
uncharted waters of a post-Brexit Britain. 
 
Jeanette Findlay 
Adam Smith Business School 
University of Glasgow 
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Managing the unintended consequences of 
competitive tendering.  
Monopolies, public monopolies, competitive tendering: 
how and when should each be used under EU law? 
Dr. John Temple Lang1 
 
Abstract 
This paper outlines the legal position in terms of EU regulations of the various options for 
delivering public services.  It considers the situation where for a number of reasons the 
service is delivered by a public or private monopoly.  The circumstances in which the 
procuring authority uses competitive tendering, regulation or some combination of both are 
outlined.  The regulations around State aid and the Altmark and Teckal exemptions are 
explained. Crucially, for the Scottish ferry industry, the question of what happens when the 
domestic incumbent loses a contract is raised. The broad scope for taking into account social 
and environmental considerations in awarding a contract for the delivery of a public service 
are elucidated. The difficulty of ensuring such contracts are specified in a way that is both 
lawful and effective are explained.  The paper concludes that regulation rather than tendering 
of public contracts may be a simpler and more effective method to ensure that the ‘most 
economically advantageous’ outcome is achieved. 
I Introduction and background 
Competitive tendering is required for important contracts for the supply of goods and services 
to public authorities. It is used for the grant of concessions giving the right to provide goods 
or services to the public. The purpose of requiring competitive tendering is, in popular terms, 
to get the best value for money, from private companies competing to provide services to the 
public in general. 
Rights given by way of concession are frequently rights to monopolies. Monopolies can be 
privately or publicly owned. The justification given for a monopoly may be non-economic and 
social, as in the case of monopolies granted for gambling or for the sale of alcohol. When a 
monopoly concession is granted, the conventional explanation may be that a monopoly is 
needed to ensure that all available economies of scale and scope can be obtained, and 
passed on to users.  Another  conventional reason is that the services to be provided include 
some that are unavoidably unprofitable,  and  that these services, since they  have to be paid  
for somehow, can most  conveniently  be paid  for by cross-subsidising them from the  
revenue  from  profitable  activities2  If this  option   is  chosen, the company involved needs 
                                                          
1 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Brussels, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, University of Oxford and 
Visiting Professor, Trinity College, Dublin. 
2 Case C-320/91, Corbeau, EU: C: 1993: 2533 
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to be protected from "cherry picking" by competitors who wish to provide only  profitable 
services.  
A second alternative, which would be a public subsidy to cover the cost of the unprofitable 
activities, would involve expense to taxpayers and cost accounting to estimate the cost of the 
activities to be subsidised.  The monopoly might be justified by the  need  to give the  investors  
an assurance of a profit in the long term if very  large  initial  investment  were  needed  in  
e.g.  a large waste   management   plant, an airport or a toll-road.     A third   alternative   is 
a publicly-owned enterprise which, if it has a monopoly, automatically cross-subsidises its 
operations to whatever extent may be necessary. 
Public authorities often consider it necessary to ensure that certain services are made 
available to everyone (universal service) at a uniform cost. The most familiar example is the 
postal service. Other   examples   are   utilities,   water,   gas,   energy,   health,   transport,   
waste   management,   and communications (television, telephone and broadband). The 
combination of a universal service obligation and a uniform price frequently means that some 
of the services will necessarily be uneconomic to supply. 
If it is decided to set up or maintain a monopoly, it may be thought necessary to decide for 
how long it should be granted, how it should be regulated, what obligations should be 
imposed, and how wide the exclusive rights granted should be. (For example, a monopoly of 
the right to provide shipping services to areas with few inhabitants would not extend to the 
right to provide air transport for passengers or goods). If the obligations imposed result in 
some services being uneconomic, it may be necessary to decide whether taxpayers should 
pay some of the cost, rather than relying only on cross-subsidisation. It will also be necessary 
to plan procedures for putting the monopoly up for competitive tender again and designed in 
such a way that as far as possible the incumbent enterprise will not have unbeatable 
advantages. If the company that obtains the monopoly is required or expected to invest in 
infrastructure, it will be essential to decide how that investment is to be financed. 
Cross-subsidies can be of many different kinds. A shipping line with obligations to service 
less inhabited areas may subsidise its uneconomic winter services from its profitable summer 
operations, or its unprofitable passenger operations from profitable commercial operations. 
Or it could subsidise its services to less inhabited areas from the profits of busy routes.  If it 
is decided not to have a monopoly, it is necessary to decide how uneconomic activities, 
resulting from universal service obligations, are to be paid for. 
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II The principles of EU law on State enterprises and monopolies   
The principles of EU law on State enterprises and monopolies can be summarised as follows 
(cf. Temple Lang, 2008, Buendia Sierra, 1996, Blum and Logue, 1998, Jones and Sufrin, 
2008, Edward and Lane 2013) 
 Directive 2014/24 deals with public procurement in general, but this does not apply 
to transport, which is dealt with by Directive 2014/25. 
 Member States must  not adopt any measures  that make  EU competition  law  
ineffective,  or  that make  it likely that a company  in a dominant position  will abuse 
its dominance. 
 European law does not prohibit publicly owned enterprises, and it allows monopolies 
to be set up and maintained if there are good reasons. Monopolies can be granted 
or maintained both for privately-owned and publicly-owned companies. 
In theory, Member States can justify setting up or extending a monopoly only if that is 
necessary to achieve a legitimate (i.e. non-protectionist) purpose3, and (perhaps) if no less 
restrictive alternative would be appropriate. In practice, however, the justification for setting 
up or maintaining a monopoly is rarely looked at critically. No justification is required for 
setting up or maintaining a publicly-owned company. 
All the competition rules apply even to State owned enterprises, subject to the exception for 
"Services of General Economic Interest", which is narrowly interpreted.  Member States may 
exempt those Services from EU law rules, but only insofar as those rules would obstruct the 
performance of the specific tasks imposed on them. A company obliged to provide a service 
of general economic interest does not need to be publicly owned. 
The most important justification for setting up a monopoly is that, without the exclusive rights 
conferred on it, it would not be possible for the enterprise to carry out its tasks "under 
economically acceptable conditions", that is, without the exclusive rights it would be 
impossible for it to have an expectation of being able to make an acceptable profit, on 
condition that it is reasonably efficient.  It may not be necessary to show that no less 
restrictive alternative was available. However, a monopoly that would otherwise be justified  
is  illegal  if  it  cannot  carry  out  efficiently the tasks assigned to it (eg a public employment  
agency  without  the  resources  needed  to find jobs satisfactorily)4 or if it is necessarily 
involved in situations of conflict  of interest  (e.g. if it  is given power to regulate its own 
                                                          
3 Case C-553, Dimosia, EU: C: 2014 
4 Case C-41/90, Hafner and Elser v. Macrotron, EU: C: 1991: 1979 
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competitors, or given the duty to supply key services to them)5.  If the monopoly is wider than 
is needed to enable the company to make a reasonable profit, the monopoly is illegal to the 
extent of the unnecessary restriction on competition. Even if a basic monopoly is justified, it 
may be unjustifiable to extend it6 
A statutory monopoly is not required by EU law to be set up by competitive tender 
If the Member State decides to finance the public service provider out of public funds, under 
the Altmark judgment7 payments that merely compensate for the cost of carrying out the 
service are not State aid. But the public service obligation must be clearly defined: the 
compensation must be calculated objectively and transparently and it must not exceed the 
cost of providing the service, plus a reasonable profit. If the enterprise is not chosen in a 
public procurement procedure, the compensation must be determined based on an analysis 
of the cost of a typical undertaking, well run, would have incurred in discharging the 
obligations, taking into account a reasonable profit. Unless all four conditions are fulfilled, 
there is State aid. The effect of this is that the rules on State aid are stricter than the rules on 
public monopolies, at least as the latter are applied in practice. 
A public authority can award a contract without a competitive tender process if the authority 
controls the economic entity, and the entity carries out the essential part of its activities with 
the authority8. 
There are also sector-specific provisions of EU law on various public services, in terms of 
universality, continuity, quality, affordability and protection of consumers and users.  It is 
assumed that as far as possible public services should be provided by competitive markets. 
A monopoly that is an "enterprise" (unlike eg a compulsory health insurance scheme based 
on "solidarity") is subject to all the usual obligations  of  a  dominant  enterprise  under  Article  
102  TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union),  in addition to whatever  
obligations  are imposed  by  the measure  establishing the monopoly. 
Although these principles are fairly clearly established, they are not always strictly enforced. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Case C-163/96, Raso EU: C: 1998: 533 
6 Case C-475/99,  Ambulanz  Glockner, EU:  C: 200 I : 8089 
7 Case C-280/00 Altmark, EU: C: 2003: 7747 
8 This is known as the "Teekal Exemption". See Case C-15/13, Technische Universitat Hamburg v. 
Daten/otsen, EU: C: 2014. See Article 12 of Directive 2014/24 
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III Obligations under Article 102, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) 
Statutory monopolies over infrastructure may have various obligations under Article 102, the 
most important of which are probably as outlined below. In any situation in which these issues 
seem likely to arise, they should probably be dealt with in advance in the conditions for the 
grant or maintenance of the monopoly, if they are not dealt with by sector-specific regulation. 
 
 The monopolist should not "tie" the monopoly services to other services not 
covered by the monopoly. For example, it should not carry cars on a car ferry 
only if the passengers are staying in hotels owned by the company. 
 If it has a monopoly of conventional car and passenger ferries, it should not use 
its control over eg a harbour to refuse access to means of transport not covered 
by its monopoly eg hovercraft or high speed passenger ferries. 
 It should not make agreements or arrangements the effect of which would be to 
make it significantly more difficult for a competitor to tender for the monopoly right 
when the right comes up for renewal. 
 It should not discriminate between companies using its services. 
 It should not create or increase obstacles or difficulties for competitors, but has 
no duty to help them unless it is a monopoly and has committed an abuse, and a 
duty to give access or to help otherwise is the appropriate remedy for the abuse 
(Temple Lang, 2016). 
Several questions arise from the issues outlined.  
In the case of a monopoly said to be needed for financial or economic reasons, what precisely 
is needed in modem conditions, and why? Why would a State subsidy be less satisfactory? 
When was the monopoly set up? Was the grant of monopoly ever the subject of competitive 
tendering? Should it be subject to competitive tendering now? Has the Member State a duty 
under Article 4(3) TEU to introduce some competition, at least into the selection of the 
monopolist? 
If it is thought that a new monopoly is justified, for how long should it be granted, on what 
terms, how should it be regulated, and what obligations should be imposed? Is any State 
subsidy required, and if so, why? In particular, how should the prices or profits of the company 
be regulated? 
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What obligations, if any, may be imposed for reasons not based on the need to make a 
modest profit, but for example in the interests of the environment or the local communities in 
the areas served? For example, may the company be required to give preferential 
employment opportunities to individuals living in the local communities? 
More fundamentally, if an enterprise has been developed over a long period to provide 
services to a community, is it possible and meaningful to put the service up to competitive 
tender at intervals, risking by implication the possibility that it will be awarded to another 
enterprise, and that the long-established enterprise will need to be wound up? This question 
is not resolved by saying, however truthfully, that an incumbent will always have legitimate 
advantages, and is likely to win a competitive tender. If an outsider has no real chance of 
succeeding against the incumbent, what would be the point of a competitive tender 
procedure? Would it be better to regulate the incumbent as far as is thought necessary, 
notwithstanding the risk of "regulatory capture" (the regulated enterprise acquiring undue 
influence over the regulatory authority)? 
EU law allows Member States to establish Services of General Economic interest, and to 
ensure that they are not subject to EU competition rules insofar as those rules would obstruct 
the tasks imposed on them. This is, in effect, a form of regulation, which allows Member 
States to  impose a  wide variety of tasks and conditions, and to subsidise tasks  insofar as 
they are loss making9. 
IV Unintended consequences of competitive tendering for specific 
projects 
It is said that competitive tendering can lead to loss of domestic employment and loss of 
strategic capacity. Both criticisms need to be addressed. In theory, to be comprehensive, a 
wide variety of different situations would need to be considered.  
Competitive tendering cannot lead to loss of domestic employment if all the companies 
bidding are based (or are legitimately required to base themselves) in the region in question. 
Indeed, it is not competitive tendering, but successful companies from outside the region that 
may lead to loss of domestic employment. Companies can be selected if they offer "the most 
economically advantageous" solutions "from the point of view of the contracting authority", 
that is, the best value, even if they do not offer the lowest price10. This phrase should be 
interpreted to allow selection of the solution most advantageous for the locality or region, not 
merely the solution most advantageous financially for the license granter. Article 67 says that 
                                                          
9 Case C-280/00 Altmark, EU: C: 2003: 7747 
10 Article 67 of Directive 2014/ 24: Article 82, Directive 2014/25 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
33 
 
the "best price-quality ratio ....shall be assessed  on the basis of criteria, including qualitative, 
environmental and/or social aspects, linked to the subject matter of the public contract in 
question".  
Award criteria or contract conditions concerning the workforce to be used are legitimate. It 
would, for example, be normal practice to oblige companies tendering for public contracts to 
have non-discriminatory hiring policies. The criticism therefore is that sometimes the most 
economically advantageous solution may involve employment of labour from outside the 
region, when local residents could equally well have been employed. That may be so, but 
there would be no justification for saying that the effect on employment in the region may not 
be taken into account when choosing the most economically advantageous solution, 
including long term effects. This is so in particular where the overall object of the exercise is 
to benefit communities in less populated areas. 
One requirement that might be explicitly adopted to obtain the most economically 
advantageous solution might legitimately be that it would employ residents of a less-
populated and under-industrialised region as far as is reasonably possible. This might be 
criticised as protectionist, and undoubtedly requires careful drafting, since it could easily 
result in illegal discrimination in favour of the incumbent or in favour of local companies. 
However, it might well be reasonable and justified, depending on the circumstances. Other 
possible selection criteria   or contract conditions would be to require the successful bidder 
to provide training for residents of the region, or to employ individuals who speak the local 
language, if it is a working language, or to use local sub-contractors as far as possible. The 
result of such an approach would probably be a negotiated arrangement:  negotiated 
arrangements are envisaged by the Directive. 
The most economically satisfactory solution should be assessed on a long term basis, and 
not only in the short term.  Specifically, it may be appropriate to oblige the successful tenderer 
to invest substantial sums in improving the service or the infrastructure, and the result of this 
might be to contribute to employment in the region as well as improving the facilities for   
everybody. 
"Loss of strategic capacity" would occur as a result of competitive tendering  only  if  the  
contract awarded to a company outside the region was for such a long period that it became 
no longer possible for companies  in the region  to bid  for the  contract when  it came up for 
renewal.  If that were  the result, the alternative would be that a solution that was not the 
most economically advantageous solution would be adopted on a permanent basis, for the  
sake  of  preserving  indigenous  strategic  capacity that, ex hypothesi, was not initially able 
to offer that solution. There may in theory be such situations, but it is not easy to think of a 
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convincing example.  If such a  situation  seemed  likely  to arise, the appropriate approach 
might be to invite tenders for partners in a joint venture with local or regional interests  
providing  some  of the strategic  capacity  that  it is desired  to maintain  and  develop.  A 
local or regional cooperative should be able to mobilise whatever resources are available for 
such a purpose. 
In other words, in both types of situation it would seem possible to use imagination to design 
an invitation to tender in such a way as to avoid or minimise the unintended consequences 
that are feared. It would be unjustified to conclude that the undesired consequences would 
inevitably be so serious and so unavoidable that no competitive tender should be arranged, 
and that therefore an inefficient incumbent monopoly or a high cost solution should be 
allowed to continue indefinitely. Discussions with companies that have expressed an interest, 
having been invited to do so, might be necessary to design the invitation to tender 
appropriately. 
One suspects that some of the difficulties that have occurred in particular cases arose 
because the possible implications for local employment were not considered and provided 
for when the invitation to tender was being drafted, and were seen too late to be dealt with 
satisfactorily. 
No amount of careful drafting can prevent situations arising in  which  the  lowest  price  is  
offered by a company from outside the region, and the operations of the  company  in  
question  may reduce employment in the region. Emphasis on the most economically 
advantageous solution overall, however, should allow the decision making body to choose 
the higher cost solution if that is thought appropriate. 
But in any situation in which it is feared that competitive tender might lead to disruption of a 
community, or of a long established and reasonably efficient service, regulation as the 
alternative to competitive tendering should be considered. The relative merits of the two 
approaches would be a matter for judgment, and European law would not dictate the result. 
V Competitive advantages and potential competition 
If there is an incumbent providing substantially the service to be put up for competitive tender, 
in practice a reasonably efficient incumbent will almost always have significant and perfectly 
justifiable advantages over any competing outsider. On the other hand, if the service is 
entirely new and there is no incumbent, the arguments for competitive tender will be 
extremely strong. But even then it is legitimate to choose the most economically 
advantageous solution, provided that the invitation to tender is appropriately written, and not 
necessarily to choose the cheapest solution. If there is no incumbent, competitive tendering 
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cannot result in loss of domestic employment: at most, it could involve a missed opportunity 
to increase it, if suitable employees were available. 
It is not unusual for a small local or regional company to be in competition with a larger 
company based outside the region. In such situations economies of scale and scope may be 
very important, and it is important, when writing the terms for the tender, to decide how much 
weight should be given to them. In general however scale economies are more likely to 
influence the lowest price rather than the most economically satisfactory solution. 
All companies that are not exposed to competition have a tendency to become inefficient and 
to stagnate and fail to modernise. Even if the circumstances are such that the legitimate 
advantages of the incumbent make it likely that it will be selected in a competitive tendering 
process, the mere fact of having to reconsider and if necessary to redesign its service every 
few years should help to ensure that it gives appropriate weight to the interests and needs of 
consumers and users. An incumbent that knows that it must take part in a regular tendering 
process will be likely to pay more attention to the services being offered elsewhere by 
potential rivals, and should improve its own operations accordingly. Potential competition is 
often a more effective influence for improvement than regulatory supervision, and in any case 
they are not mutually exclusive. 
It should also be remembered that if an incumbent is supervised or regulated in some way, 
there is always a risk of "regulatory capture", that is, the entity supposedly being supervised  
may obtain too much influence over the thinking of the body intended to supervise or regulate 
it. That risk should be significantly reduced if both parties know that a competitive tendering 
process will occur at regular intervals, provided that the final conditions of each tender are 
determined by an authority other than the supposed supervisor. 
Value for money in public procurement is said to be based on economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness.  Economy and efficiency are self-explanatory and can be measured. 
Effectiveness is more difficult to measure, for a range of reasons. First, we are making a 
judgement based on defined objectives, and there arises a question about whether such 
objectives are the   "right" ones:  has   the organization   targeted   the most   beneficial   
outputs and   outcomes?  Secondly, the ultimate outcomes for most public services are better 
lifestyles for individuals and healthier, better educated, better housed, more economically 
successful and more stable and cohesive communities as a whole. Judgements around 
these things are notoriously subjective, and often politically and culturally sensitive. 
(Arrowsmith, 2014). 
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This view is certainly correct, and several conclusions can be drawn from it. First, the 
authority that is defining the objectives of the project has a considerable latitude and 
discretion in defining them in the invitation to tender. However, it should be careful to define 
them clearly and explicitly. Second, if the authority's decision is challenged in court, the court 
should be slow to invalidate either the objectives stated in the invitation to tender or the 
decision finally arrived at by the awarding body. In other words, the court should not substitute 
its discretion for the discretion of the awarding body. Third, all the desired objectives may not 
be fully obtainable at the same time, and priorities may need to be decided, or compromises 
reached. 
VI The ‘most economically advantageous’ solution for the community in 
question 
A fourth conclusion seems reasonable. It is open to  national  legislatures, acting within  the 
terms of the EU directives, to explain and elaborate by  legislation  the  concept  of  the  "most 
economically advantageous" solution, to make it more clear that it includes social and 
environmental objectives and advantages for the community in question as well as  financial  
advantages  for  the  taxpayer paying the bill. National legislation to clarify and confirm this 
may  not be necessary,  but  it might be desirable, in order to promote flexibility  and  reduce  
uncertainty  about  the  freedom  of awarding authorities to promote their chosen objectives, 
and to avoid or minimise unintended consequences. 
"Effectiveness" can mean both the success of the project in the light of its declared objectives, 
and the desirable effects of the way in which it is to be carried out. The invitation to tender 
can, if the awarding authority wishes, indicate how the work is to be  done (although  the 
authority should  not  tie  the hands  of the  successful  competitor  so much  that  little scope 
is left for initiative  and imagination). 
These suggestions do not mean that the awarding authority can create a situation in which it 
is discriminating in favour of the incumbent or local firms: all arrangements of the kinds 
suggested would need to be carefully written and justified. They would therefore be more 
trouble to write, and probably more controversial to implement, than a simpler arrangement, 
or than regulation. The authority would therefore need to consider carefully whether the extra 
work was worthwhile. 
VII Sector specific regulation 
If the industry in question is a regulated  industry,  such as transport  or telecommunications, 
the  regulatory  regime  may  provide   protection  for  local  or regional  interests that  it might  
be difficult to ensure by selection criteria or conditions in public contracts alone. In any case, 
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any invitation to tender must always be carefully integrated into the applicable regulatory 
regime. A regulatory approach may be more appropriate and more effective to achieve 
economic aims than trying to use public contracts alone. If the objectives are important, all 
available legal mechanisms should be considered, and used in combination if appropriate. 
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Calm seas or choppy waters? The role of 
procurement in supporting Fair Work 
Patricia Findlay, Department of Human Resource Management, University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract 
Fair work is now firmly on the political agenda in Scotland and there is ongoing debate about 
how best to drive it.  After considering the policy context in which debates on fair work have 
emerged, and examining the Scottish approach to fair work, this article considers the role of 
public procurement as a lever of fair work.   While not focussing in any depth on the 
procurement of lifeline ferry services, the arguments presented here are relevant to any 
competitive tendering process for these services.  This article argues that recent statutory 
guidance illustrates the potential of procurement to support fair work due to the impact of fair 
work on the quality of service provision and its role in delivering economically advantageous 
outcomes. While there may be medium term changes to the procurement environment post-
Brexit, devolution of responsibility for procurement means that scope to support fair work 
should remain in relatively calm waters, so long as there is political will to use procurement 
creatively for this important purpose.     
 
I Introduction 
A commitment to fair work is now a key focus of Scottish Government, central to Scotland’s 
Economic Strategy and at the heart of efforts to deliver inclusive growth.  Charged with 
advising Scottish Government in relation to fair work, the Fair Work Convention in its Fair 
Work Framework (2016a; 2016b) has identified procurement as one of the levers available 
to government and to the wider public sector in supporting and driving this agenda across 
private and third sector employers, using public spending to leverage fair work practices and 
outcomes. Under current EU and Scottish procurement legislation and regulations, most of 
that procurement will be competitively tendered.   
Fair work provides one example of the potential and challenges of using public procurement 
to support government policy objectives.  This article examines the policy context of fair work 
in Scotland, the role of procurement in delivering fair work and the implications of fair work 
for competitive tendering, as well as the implications of competitive tendering for fair work, in 
the current context. Given prevailing Brexit and constitutional uncertainties, the article 
explores future scenarios for using procurement to drive fair work in Scotland. While making 
few specific arguments in relation to the provision of lifeline ferry services – the focus of this 
special issue - the arguments presented here are relevant to any competitive tendering 
process in relation to such provision.  
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II Fair Work for Scotland 
The Fair work agenda in Scotland emerged over recent years as a response to economic 
and social challenges including the need for action to address Scotland and the UK’s low 
relative productivity; the need to promote higher value business models; the need to address 
relatively low levels of business innovation; the need to improve job quality, and in particular 
to address low pay, under-employment, skills under-utilisation and work intensification; and 
the need to address income inequality and limited social mobility.  As Findlay et al have 
argued, “… these challenges are complex and interconnected – genuinely ‘wicked problems’ 
– and require smart, joined-up and holistic policy solutions” (2016a:1).  
Scottish Government’s commitment to fair work, and the establishment of the Fair Work 
Convention in 2014, represented a culmination of a series of debates across a group of 
stakeholders in Scotland over the preceding decade on substantive policy in relation to the 
workplace and over how to support greater policy consensus around work, employment and 
workplace issues.  In the early to mid-2000s, both Scotland and the rest of the UK 
emphasised the importance of improving skills supply through investing in learning, skills and 
qualifications at all levels to address productivity and other challenges (as exemplified in the 
Leitch Review of Skills, 2006).  Policy debates in Scotland responded more quickly thereafter 
to the limitations of a skills-supply driven approach to productivity by focussing on the need 
for more effective skills utilisation and identifying the workplace conditions that support better 
skills utilisation, leading to a distinctive trajectory of debates in Scotland around the concept 
of workplace innovation (Findlay et al, 2015).  An expansive approach to workplace 
innovation in Scotland has explored how to improve job quality and fair work (including 
addressing in-work poverty) while simultaneously improving business performance (Findlay 
et al 2016a).  In addition to developing distinct policy priorities, the process of policy formation 
around the workplace in Scotland has reflected an informal social partnership approach that 
values collaborative partnerships between policy makers, practitioners and academics 
(Findlay et al 2016b).  
Fair work is defined by the FWC as work that offers effective voice, opportunity, security, 
fulfilment and respect, that balances the rights and responsibilities of employers and 
employees and that can deliver benefits for individuals, businesses/organisations and 
society.  Behind this definition is a recognition that the absence of fair work, broadly defined, 
can damage individuals, businesses, the economy and society while its presence can 
generate a virtuous circle of individual, business, economic and societal benefits (Fair Work 
Convention, 2016b) 
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There are a wide range of stakeholders who might drive the adoption of fair work practices 
in Scotland.  In very simple terms, the state and employers – at their own behest or 
responding to influence from trade unions, researchers, campaigning organisations and 
other stakeholders – hold the key levers to deliver fair work.  Government, public authorities 
and other employers have a direct role in ensuring fair work for their own workers, while 
government also has a more direct role in shaping fair work practices across parts of the 
public sector for which it has direct authority, including public sector bidders for procured 
contracts.  
Beyond public sector and public bidder workforces, government can influence the adoption 
of certain fair work practices (for example, minimum wage levels; rights in relation to training; 
rights in relation to employee voice) by legislation and regulation, but this lever is not open 
to the Scottish Government given that employment law powers are reserved to Westminster.  
Scottish Government can, however, exhort, encourage or incentivise employers to adopt fair 
work practices (for example, through the provision of business support services by public 
agencies), with varying degrees of effectiveness. An additional, and potentially powerful 
lever, however, for government and the wider public sector is to use purchasing power to 
shape fair workplace practice.  
III Procuring Fair Work 
There is growing global recognition of the potential of procurement as a strategic instrument 
for the economy, delivering efficient and effective services and promoting policy priorities 
(OECD, 2013).  Procurement encompasses a third of government expenditures across the 
OECD, constituting 13% of GDP on average.  In Scotland, public sector spend of over £10bn 
per year on goods and services is recognised by government not only as a route to delivering 
improved public services but also as a platform for delivering a more prosperous, fairer and 
more sustainable Scotland.  Derived from EU Procurement rules and governed by the 
Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, the aspiration is for “business friendly, socially 
responsible procurement that delivers better outcomes for Scotland”. 
In thinking about the potential for public procurement to support the fair work agenda, it is 
important to address the scope in current competitive tendering arrangements to support 
particular fair work practices and greater emphasis on fair work approaches.  Certain fair 
work practices, such as support for equality and diversity, have long featured in competitive 
tendering procedures in Scotland.  Public procurement can take into account how bidders 
can generate community or social benefits through their activities within any particular 
contract.  These Community Benefit Clauses (CBCs) are contractual and relate to economic, 
social or environmental conditions that are built into the specification and delivery. CBCs 
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used appropriately – that is, linked to core purpose of the contract, not disadvantaging 
suppliers from other EU Member States and representing value for money - are lawful tools 
under EU procurement rules. Notwithstanding concerns over limitations in the data available 
on CBCs, there is some evidence to suggest that CBCs can have a positive impact and can 
help deliver key National Outcomes for Scotland particularly in relation to employment 
opportunities, education and skills – especially for young people - and tackling inequality 
(Sutherland et al 2015). 
There is, therefore, some overlap in the areas highlighted in CBCs and elements of the fair 
work agenda and adopting a broad approach to defining ‘economically advantageous’ may 
allow even more scope for CBCs to support some fair work practices.  More directly, in 
October 2015, Scottish Government published Statutory Guidance on the Selection of 
Tenderers and Award of Contracts: Addressing Fair Work Practices, including the Living 
Wage, in Procurement. This Guidance is noteworthy in making a strong statement not only 
of the potential social or community benefits of supporting fair work practices, but of the 
critical importance of fair work in ensuring service quality, thus defining fair work as crucial 
to contract performance.    
The fair work practices illustrated in the Guidance are broad ranging – not just in ensuring 
that public contractors comply with relevant employment, equality and health and safety law, 
human rights standards and collective agreements - but going far beyond compliance to 
include consideration of fairness in recruitment, remuneration, contractual arrangements, 
skills utilisation, job support, employee engagement and worker representation, specifically 
but not limited to representation through trade unions. Moreover, the Guidance highlights not 
just the direct employment practices of any potential contractor, but also those in any sub-
contracting chain. The Guidance thus highlights the need for those supplying public contracts 
to be ‘good’ employers and for contracting authorities to be mindful of poor employment 
practices that might impact on the quality of the contract to be delivered. 
As with all procurement requirements, consideration of a tenderer’s fair work practices must 
be proportionate. Distinction is made between circumstances whereby a bidder/tenderer’s 
fair work practices are more or less related to the subject matter of the contract. The 
Guidance suggests that fair work practices are likely to be more relevant to contracts for the 
delivery of services rather than of goods, though fair work practices should be considered 
where the workforces supplying the goods impact on their quality. 
On the face of it, therefore, in any public competitive tendering scenario, it is appropriate for 
a contracting authority to ask how tenderers commit to fair work practices for workers 
(including any agency or sub-contractor workers) engaged in the delivery of the proposed 
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contract. It is also appropriate for management and monitoring of contracts to take place to 
ensure that fair work practice continues throughout the contract duration.  
Taken alongside the potential of CBCs, procurement in line with this Statutory Guidance 
could offer a powerful lever for change.  The Guidance does not specify what fair work must 
look like, allowing bidders to define fair work in their specific context, albeit against the 
backdrop of the Fair Work Framework and its key dimensions, thus offering some flexibility 
to bidders to reflect particular product and labour market factors. Bidders are invited to specify 
fair work in their own terms and the Guidance is explicit that distinct fair work practices – in 
particular, payment of the Living Wage Campaign Living Wage – are not required, though 
might be indicative of a commitment to fair work.  
Public bidders for publicly procured work may find that their suite of work and employment 
practices are well aligned with the Statutory Guidance on fair work.  Evidence suggest that 
public organisations are more likely to be able to point to specific practices that are consistent 
with fair work and are cited as examples in the Guidance, such as involving employees in 
decision making and encouraging employees to join and be active in trade unions, 
undertaking equal pay audits and paying the Living Wage. Given the focus of this special 
issue on competitive tendering for lifeline ferry services, there is evidence that the current 
practices of the public sector ferry operator (Cal-Mac) resonate with elements of the Statutory 
Guidance on fair work in procurement.  The quality of the service provided is crucially 
important, not simply in terms of routine customer service, but crucially in terms of the duty 
to ensure safety at sea which impacts not only on the training, certification and experience 
of seafarers but extends also to the training of catering and other staff to respond in 
emergency situations and to support flexibility in roles and deployment (Findlay, Commander 
and Warhurst, 2011).  Cal-Mac is also a Living Wage accredited employer, provides effective 
voice through recognised trades unions; offers opportunity and fulfilment through long-
established career progression mechanisms; and offers security which is evidenced by the 
very long average service lengths of its employees and its above-average wage structure.  
These fair work practices that deliver flexible, highly trained and experienced staff are crucial 
to the delivery of ferry services, their outstanding safety record and their economic impact 
(Fraser of Allander Institute, 2015). 
The Guidance does not, however, offer any specific advice on the weight to be attached to a 
tenderer’s fair work approach, and very little is currently known on how these Guidelines are 
being operationalised or are impacting on procurement practice, although this issue is 
currently on the radar of the Fair Work Convention. A recent analysis by Unison (2017) of 
the impact of fair work on the procurement of social care services posed the view that the 
fair work element should be weighted heavily, given that the quality of social care provision 
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is heavily reliant on the quality of social care staff.  Unison’s inquiries of councils indicated 
that the weighting for fair work ranged from 4% to 40%, with 11 out of the 15 councils who 
responded reporting a weighting of 10% or less.  Unison argue that “For a service that is 
almost entirely dependent on people for quality delivery, a weighting of less than 20% is 
unacceptable. We are also aware that very little hard evidence is sought from bidders under 
this heading” (2016:2).   
A key issue, therefore, will be the willingness of public bodies to use the Statutory Guidance 
to promote fair work.  Some concerns have been raised at a UK level over an over-complex 
interpretation of existing EU procurement legislation, which if replicated in Scotland could in 
turn limit the impact of the Statutory Guidance on fair work. Moreover, procurement in 
Scotland is spread across multiple public authorities and while this Statutory Guidance 
envelops all, there is as yet no data that can point to its overall impact.  Given that the 
Guidance is just over a year old, some time is required to appreciate and evaluate its effect. 
IV Brexit implications 
Of course, the coming years will not serve solely as a testbed for the impact of the statutory 
guidance in relation to fair work, given Brexit and other constitutional uncertainties.  It is clear 
that, for a number of years at least, EU procurement rules will govern public procurement in 
Scotland.  As Arrowsmith notes, existing regulations will remain during negotiations for Brexit, 
which will probably last at least until the end of 2019 and possibly much longer. How 
procurement will be regulated after that, however, is hard to predict.” (2016: 3).  She outlines 
3 options.  In scenario 1, the UK negotiates a trade agreement with the EU that results in the 
procurement regime applying exactly as it does now.  In scenario 2, a more limited agreement 
with the EU based on the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement could reduce EU 
procurement application in utilities, defence and concessions (with reduced opportunities for 
UK suppliers in those markets elsewhere). In scenario 3 there is no concluded agreement on 
procurement, resulting in no access to foreign procurement markets but greater UK flexibility 
to design its own procurement regulations.  
While scenario 2 and more substantially scenario 3 in theory give opportunity to change the 
national procurement system, it is worth bearing in mind that the UK was very influential in 
the drafting of the latest EU procurement directive, so current arrangements may already 
largely reflect what the UK wants and needs from, and is likely to design into, a procurement 
system (The Guardian, 2016).  Notwithstanding what this suggests about any new ‘national’ 
procurement rules, Arrowsmith has also noted that if the UK is outside of EU procurement 
rules, in the context of the devolution of public procurement since 1998, a likely consequence 
is greater divergence in procurement rules in Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
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not least in terms of what she refers to as “… the strong political pressure outside England 
to use procurement as a tool to promote local industry and social policies (2016: 15).     
Of course, the macro-economic impact of Brexit and the macro-economic policy adopted at 
a UK level in response to emerging challenges may make it more difficult to deliver on a 
commitment to fair work in Scotland.  While some recent comments from the UK government 
may reflect sabre-rattling, any moves to a low-cost, low value competitive model for Britain 
post-Brexit is a real and significant threat to the fair work agenda in Scotland.   
V Conclusion 
This article has discussed the role of public procurement in supporting the delivery of the 
policy objective of fair work, though some of the arguments considered here could also apply 
to other policy aspirations.  It contends that there is scope in existing procurement rules to 
support and develop fair work practices in Scotland by influencing the activities and 
approaches of private and public bidders in competitive tendering processes.  Moving from 
potential to action and impact requires a consistent political will in supporting fair work – and 
in recognising the link between fair work and high quality service delivery - and a willingness 
to use existing levers appropriately.  Brexit may or may not result in a changed procurement 
scenario.  Any additional potential to use procurement in support of fair work will be highly 
dependent on sustained political commitment to the central role of fair work in driving 
inclusive growth in Scotland. 
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Scottish ferries: sailing towards greater energy 
efficiency and decarbonisation? 
Nishatabbas Rehmatulla, UCL Energy Institute 
 
Abstract 
The Paris Agreement, UK and Scotland Climate Change Acts provide a clear direction of 
travel for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  Scotland’s climate targets would require that 
the domestic transport sector be nearly completely decarbonised. Existing analysis shows 
that there are inefficiencies in the procurement of ferries, both in Scotland and the rest of 
Europe, which mean that energy efficiency and decarbonisation opportunities may be 
forgone in certain situations.  The age of ferries has a direct impact on their efficiency and 
the analysis shows that, whilst Scottish ferries are younger than their counterparts 
elsewhere, when disaggregating by operator, there seems to be some correlation between 
public and private operators with regards to age of the ferries. Implementation of 
incremental energy efficiency technologies and measures in ferries may be hindered due to 
market failures, and total decarbonisation may be hindered by non-market failures.  
I Introduction 
The UK and Scotland have both agreed to reduce CO2 emissions by 80% below 1990 levels 
by 2050 through the UK Climate Change Act 2008 and Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009. 
Scotland’s Climate Change Act 2009 contains an interim target of a 42% reduction by 2020 
and a 50% reduction by 2030, on 1990 levels. Emissions from domestic transport accounted 
for just over 20% (13 MtCO2e) of total Scottish GHG emissions in 2014, whilst international 
aviation and shipping account for a further 5% of total emissions (CCC 2015). Given these 
climate change targets, the domestic transport sector will require to be almost totally 
decarbonised. Reductions in emissions, from road transport for example, are being made 
through various initiatives and strategies incentivising the uptake of electric vehicles and 
changing behaviours, thus helping to meet the sector’s challenging targets.  
Decarbonisation in ferries can begin from implementation of measures to improve energy 
efficiency (design related measures, hydrodynamic measures and machinery measures) for 
both existing ships (through retrofits) and new ferries. Thereafter, weaning off from fossil 
fuels through greater use of low carbon fuels (e.g. bio-diesel and liquid natural gas) and 
eventually shifting towards renewable forms of energy (e.g. wind and solar) and synthetic 
fuels (e.g. hydrogen),  will be required to reach decarbonisation. For a complete list of 
technologies applicable to ferries refer to the appendix. There are several examples of ferries 
in operation that have already achieved zero emissions, for example the Ampere, a fully 
electric car ferry owned and operated by Norwegian operator Norled. CalMac already owns 
three hybrid ferries (lithium ion batteries), which has resulted in 20% reduction in emissions 
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and is already carrying out feasibility studies to evaluate the role of hydrogen and fuel cells, 
under EU funded projects.  
The implications of Brexit on procurement of ferries remains unclear. EU policies impacting 
the procurement of ferry services is covered by three key pieces of legislations; EU council 
regulation No. 3577/92 (the Cabotage regulation) regulates the transportation of passengers 
and goods by sea between two points within Member States of the EU; Directive 2014/25/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26th February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors repealing 
Directive 2004/17/EC and Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26th February 2014 on public procurement, repealing Directive 2004/18/EC. These 
directives determine when an undertaking incurring a Public Service Obligation (PSO) has 
to be selected using a public procurement procedure and what the terms of this procedure 
can be.  
This aim of this paper is to review the literature on the impact of tendering on delivering an 
environmentally friendly ferry service, comparing the current state of Scottish ferries with 
other European nation ferries, and assess whether there are barriers that could hinder 
Scottish ferries achieving greater energy efficiency and near decarbonisation. 
II Procurement of ferry services 
Tendering has been suggested as a means to induce cost efficiency and thus reductions in 
the costly public subsidies (Sunde 1999) by replacing market competition with ‘access to’ 
market competition. For a review of the European ferry sector procurement policies refer to 
Rehmatulla, Smith & Tibbles (2017).  Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev (2010) and Baird & 
Wilmsmeier (2011) show that ferry subsidies in EU member states have been rising despite 
the competitive tendering of ferry services introduced in many EU member states. Tendering 
procedures that are thought to improve the prevalent ferry services in terms of value for 
money for the consumers and public agencies is not yielding the desired or expected results.  
Førsund (1993), Minken & Killi (2001), Bråthen et al. (2004) and Odeck & Bråthen (2007) 
show that there may be cost efficiency gains in the range up to 30% in the EU ferry links 
analysed. Even in the case of Norway, which is free from the EU procurement regulations 
but adopts similar approaches to procurement as EU, Bråthen et al. (2004) show that 
tendered ferry links did not outperform non-tendered ferry links and that the subsidising 
authorities do not seem to impact on the performance of ferry links.  
Rehmatulla, Smith & Tibbles (2017) analysis of the EU ferry sector using agency theory 
suggests that split incentives (associated with the different entities and their conflicting 
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interests) are pervasive in the public procurement of ferries and can stymie attempts to 
improve the energy efficiency of ferry services. Their findings suggest that there is a need to 
devise procurement policies that can address the split incentives in public procurement 
through tendering under EU regulations. Baird (2012) and Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev 
(2010) show that, uneconomic routes offer reduced return for operators, despite being 
subsidised. The reduced returns for operators act as a disincentive to them investing in 
energy efficiency. These findings have important implications on the efficacy of the public 
procurement of ferry services through tendering, as they suggest production costs (e.g. 
labour, capital and fuel) are not minimised, therefore suggesting that energy efficiency 
savings may be forgone in certain situations. 
Research by Odeck & Bråthen (2007) indicates that the age of ferries has a direct impact on 
their energy efficiency. The most likely explanation is that newer ferries are more fuel efficient 
than older ones. Using age as a proxy for energy efficiency this section attempts to distil the 
case using quantitative data on the ferry fleet within Scotland and the EU to show whether 
there are any trends on energy efficiency that may be occurring due to procurement 
procedures. 
Table 1 shows a comparison of Scottish ferry companies and other major European private 
publicly-owned and operated and privately-owned and operated ferry companies. The 
average age of Scottish ferry operator ferries is higher (just over twenty-one years on 
average), than the major route operators in other parts of the EU (fifteen years on average). 
The table also shows that the average age of the privately-owned operators’ fleet is 
approximately seventeen years compared to publicly-owned operators whose average is 
twenty-one years. 
Figure 1 shows the average age of vessels owned by public and major private operators.  
One third of UK flagged ferries is over 25 years of age (Figure 2) which is lower than that of 
all EU flagged ferries, where almost half of the fleet is over 25 years of age (Rehmatulla, 
Smith & Tibbles 2017). The average age of UK flagged fleet is 23 years compared to the EU 
average of 29 years.  
It has been suggested that if the Scandinavian (mainly Norwegian) approach to ferry 
operation were adopted in Scotland in terms of vessel and terminal design, operating 
practices and PSO policy (e.g. provide-and-operate contracts), substantial savings could be 
made in terms capital and operating costs (Pedersen 2015). A comparative analysis shows 
that Norway actually has a higher proportion of its fleet that is beyond the expected ferry life 
of twenty-five years compared to the UK, as is shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 confirms the 
strategy employed in Norway in the past couple of decades, of smaller sized vessels and 
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faster services (using catamarans) and increased frequency compared to the UK, which has 
been deploying generally larger ships at slower speeds. From an environmental view point, 
larger ships (assuming high capacity utilisation) and slower ships result in significantly lower 
emissions than smaller, faster ships. A 10% reduction in speed results in nearly a 30% 
reduction in power requirements, thus speed reduction as an operational measure is 
considered to have one of the highest impacts on energy efficiency and emissions. The 
reduction in speed can translate into significant cost savings in fuel for the ferry operator and 
therefore travel costs and fares for passengers, if fuel cost savings are passed on. It is 
estimated that in a large car and passenger ferry, a reduction of 0.5 knots would result in 
20% reduction in fuel consumption and CO2 emissions whilst only adding five minutes to a 
two-hour journey or an extra 4% on transit time (Scottish Government 2011). 
Table 1: Average age of vessels owned by public and private companies[1] (2014 data) 
Company 
Headquarters 
location 
No. of 
vessels 
Average 
age 
Ownership 
Tallink Group EU 11 13 Private 
Blue Star Ferries SA Greece 10 14 Private 
Compagnia Italiana Italy 10 14 Private 
Brittany Ferries France 9 14 Private 
DFDS A/S Denmark 11 15 Private 
Ustica Lines SpA Italy 28 15 Private 
Acciona Trasmed. Spain 10 15 Private 
Wightlink Ltd. UK 13 18 Private 
Stena Line AB EU 19 18 Private 
Transtejo-Transp. Portugal 12 20 Private 
Western Ferries Scotland, UK 5 15 
Private 
(unsubsidised) 
Pentland Ferries Scotland, UK 2 25 
Private 
(unsubsidised) 
John O'Groats Scotland, UK 1 28 
Private 
(unsubsidised) 
CalMac Scotland, UK 29 20 Public 
Northlink Ferries Scotland, UK 2 12 Public 
Orkney Island Council Ferries Scotland, UK 7 24 Public 
Shetland Council Ferries Scotland, UK 11 22 Public 
Highland Council Scotland, UK 3 33 Public 
Argyll and Bute Council Scotland, UK 1 13 Public 
[1] Data obtained from Clarksons World Fleet Register. This data set does not have good coverage of ferries, especially 
small sized vessels. 
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Figure 1: Average age of vessels owned by public and major private operators (2014) 
 
 
Figure 2: UK ferries by age distribution (2016) 
 
The analysis above shows that Scottish ferries are in general younger compared to other 
European nations, including Norway.  However when one disaggregates by operator, there 
seems to be some correlation between public and private operators with regards to age, both 
in the Scottish and EU context. If the data is considered a representative sample, then it 
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points towards differences across nations that are supposed to be using a Europe-wide 
procurement framework. The analysis presented here should not be construed as final, but 
as preliminary findings and should be read with caution. Further work is required for a 
thorough analysis. 
 
Figure 3: Norwegian ferries by age distribution (2016) 
 
Figure 4: Relative comparison of UK and Norwegian ferry fleet by age (2016) 
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Figure 5: Relative comparison of UK and Norwegian ferry fleet by average Gross Tonnage 
and speed (2016) 
 
 
III Barriers to decarbonisation of the Scottish ferry sector 
The previous section discussed several factors that show that the provision of ferry services 
under the different procurement strategies are not optimal. Rehmatulla, Smith & Tibbles 
(2017) suggest these can be linked to whether; the contract is an operate-only or provide-
and-operate contract; the contracts are based on gross or net cost; the operator is publicly, 
privately or community owned; and, the investor can recoup higher investment costs through 
higher charter rates.  
A large number of energy efficiency measures, especially operational ones, are cost-effective 
and tend to have substantial emissions abatement potential when implemented in ferries, yet 
their implementation is not at the level that would be expected from an economist’s economic 
potential and technologist’s economic potential (Jaffe & Stavins 1994). This leads to an 
‘energy efficiency gap’, the difference between the actual low levels of implementation of 
energy efficiency measures and the higher level that would appear to be cost-beneficial or 
cost-effective from the consumers’ or firm’s point of view based on techno-economic analysis 
(Rehmatulla & Smith 2015a). A plausible explanation for the gap is the existence of energy 
efficiency barriers, which may be defined as postulated mechanisms that inhibit investment 
in technologies that are both energy efficient and economically efficient (Sorrell et al. 2000). 
Barriers to energy efficiency can stem from organisational (power, culture etc.), behavioural 
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(bounded rationality, values etc.), market failures (split incentives, information asymmetry, 
imperfect information) and non-market failures (access to capital, risk etc.). For a full 
explanation of these in context of shipping refer to Rehmatulla & Smith (2015b).  
Market failures 
Implementation of incremental energy efficiency technologies and measures may be 
hindered due to market failures, such as lack of information and split incentives (Adland et 
al. 2017; Agnolucci, Smith & Rehmatulla 2014; Prakash et al. 2016). Going beyond a certain 
emissions reduction level would most likely require use of alternative fuels with lower carbon 
content (e.g. biofuels and synthetic fuels, such as hydrogen) and the implementation of such 
step-change technologies is impacted by non-market failures, such as access to capital 
(Grant Thornton 2010), and different forms of risks (Rehmatulla et al. 2017). Analysis by 
Aquatera (2016), commissioned by Orkney Islands Council, suggests a number of alternative 
fuels options are available for low carbon ferries, but conclude that whilst moving towards 
cleaner technologies will have, across all the alternative options, on average 50% reduction 
in emissions compared to marine diesel, their implementation will have significant cost 
implications and will depend on the priorities of the decision makers. It is therefore interesting 
to note that, whilst the Vessel Replacement and Deployment Plan (VRDP) includes energy 
efficiency and emissions as part of its priorities, it places fuel efficiency and emissions 
reduction as the seventh and lowest priority (Transport Scotland 2015).  
Split incentives 
Improvements in energy efficiency and decarbonisation of the Scottish ferries may be 
impacted by split incentives of the various entities involved in the system. The delivery of 
ferry services is thus impacted by various recursions of principal-agent relationships, for 
example, between the ferry operator and the ferry owner, the government and the operator, 
the local authority and the government, ferry users and ferry operators. The implication of 
multiple principle agent relationships is that energy efficiency may not be a priority for 
different entities in the principal-agent chain as a result of different cost responsibilities, 
energy price shielding and other constraints. For example, the previous section showed the 
impact of marginal speed reduction on GHG emissions, yet the Scottish Ferries Review 
consultations showed that consultees were not supportive of reductions in speed with a 
preference for technological solutions mainly in newbuilds compared to retrofitting the 
existing fleet (Scottish Government 2011). It is encouraging to note that the Expert Ferry 
Group has revisited the issue of speed reduction and will continue to investigate further with 
quantitative analysis (Transport Scotland 2016). 
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Given that the majority of ferry routes in Scotland are under operate-only contracts (i.e. the 
Scottish Government or public bodies, for example councils who own and/or provide vessels) 
one would expect to see a higher level of implementation of energy efficiency and low carbon 
solutions in Scottish ferries. Such investments are viewed over a long-term investment 
horizon and the lifetime of vessels, which should lead to higher implementation of energy 
efficiency measures, since several technologies have a payback generally ranging from a 
couple of years to ten years (Wang et al. 2010). Operate-only contracts provide further 
certainty that a vessel will be on a particular route for its life and as a result the investment in 
the port and harbour infrastructure and the ship-port configuration leads to further efficiency 
gains, as such ferries save energy and emissions on manoeuvring and speed. The long-term 
vested interest in such ferries, should result in better maintenance, for example, appropriate 
hull coating and hull cleaning regime, which could save a significant amount of fuel and 
emissions.  
However, operate-only contracts also have their drawbacks in context of GHG emissions and 
energy efficiency and this can also be witnessed in the Scottish ferries sector. During the 
tendering process, bidding firms may be prevented from offering vessels which may be more 
energy efficient and instead have to accept existing vessels that may not be the most 
efficient, which in turn will affect the bidding as increased fuel costs need to be taken into 
account. The central government or the public body has to find the capital to procure newer 
vessels and under existing circumstances this is a challenging task (Grant Thornton 2010). 
This affects the fleet turnover and as a result some very old ships continue to operate in 
Scottish waters. Also of importance in operate-only contracts is the ability of the ferry provider 
to recoup the higher investments in energy efficient ferries, through higher bareboat charter 
rates. Empirical evidence to date shows that in the drybulk shipping time-charter market only 
around 15-40% of energy savings are recouped by higher charter rates (Agnolucci, Smith & 
Rehmatulla 2014; Adland et al. 2017). However, the structure and provision of ferry services 
(lower frequency of chartering and longer lead time in the contracting process) may mean 
that energy efficiency is well scrutinised. Further work in this area is required to estimate the 
extent to which the fuel cost savings by operators are passed back to the ferry owner through 
a higher charter rate. 
IV Concluding remarks 
The Paris Agreement, UK Climate Change Act and the Climate Change (Scotland) Act all 
provide a clear sense of direction and a long-term objective for all sectors, including ferries. 
Given the average economic lifespan of ferries, investment decisions made today would 
need to account for an evolving emissions landscape and manage decarbonisation. This 
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paper highlights several issues with respect to energy efficiency and low carbon ferry 
services. From the quantitative data, it is not evident that competitive tendering within the 
Scottish context, has led to improvements in energy efficiency of ferries and the problems 
that competitive tendering seeks to overcome appear to be present from a principal-agent 
perspective. Whilst, EU procurement policies have made some progress to incorporate 
energy efficiency and GHG issues by incorporating life-cycle costing and environmental 
externalities into procurement directives, Member States still enjoy considerable flexibility in 
determining how much emphasis should be placed upon these. Procurement policies have 
yet to overcome the issue of split incentives, which as understood is pervasive in the 
provision of ferry services in most cases. Most important is the priority that is accorded to 
energy efficiency and emissions by different entities in the ferry sector. This need not be a 
costly exercise, as shown for some measures (e.g. speed reduction, other operational 
measures and maintenance strategies) there could be significant savings in monetary terms 
for ferry passengers as well as overall GHG emissions from the sector. For measures that 
require significant capital outlay (e.g. alternative fuels) alternative and newly emerging forms 
of financing, such as green bonds, should be considered. This work has used secondary 
data sources to try and unpack the issues and barriers to energy efficiency and 
decarbonisation of the Scottish ferries sector.  However, further work could collect data using 
participatory approaches such as interviews and focus groups with the industry stakeholders 
to better understand and provide solutions and recommendations to improve the energy 
efficiency and emissions of the ferry sector in order to meet Scotland’s challenging climate 
targets. 
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Appendix 
Energy efficiency and low carbon solutions for ferries 
Design based technologies Hydrodynamic technologies 
Aft waterline extension 
Skeg shape/trailing edge optimisation 
Optimisation of hull openings 
Shaft line arrangement 
Bulbous bow 
Lightweight construction 
Air lubrication 
Design speed reduction - smaller 
engine 
Design speed reduction - engine 
derating 
Superstructure aerodynamics 
 
Propeller modifications (advanced blade sections, 
winglets/Kappel,prop section optimisation) 
Propeller/rudder integration (propeller rudder bulb, 
propeller rudder matching/combination, 
asymmetric rudder) 
Pre/postswirl devices (boss cap fin, vane wheel, 
presswork ducts, mews duct, stator fins) 
Pods/thrusters (wing thrusters, pulling thrusters, 
wing pod, pulling pod) 
Contra-rotating propellers 
Other hull streamlining (low profile openings, 
optimisation of water flow openings) 
 
Machinery technologies Alternative energy sources and energy carriers 
Common rail 
Diesel electric drive 
Combined Diesel/electric & Diesel 
mechanical drive (CODED) 
Hybrid shaft generator 
Engine tuning 
Low loss power distribution 
Variable speed electric power generation 
Power take off/shaft generator 
Speed control of pumps and fans 
Waste heat recovery 
Energy saving lighting 
Efficient boiler 
 
Solar power 
Wind power – kites, sails and Flettner 
rotors 
Batteries and fuel cells  
Biofuels 
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) 
Cold ironing/shore power 
Hyrdogen 
Ammonia 
Methanol 
 
Maintenance strategies Operational measures 
Propeller condition based maintenance 
Regular/interval based propeller 
maintenance 
Advanced propeller coating and paints 
Hull cleaning 
Hull surface coating - biocidal 
Hull surface coating - foul release 
 
Weather routing 
Autopilot upgrade/adjustments 
General speed reduction 
Advanced fuel consumption monitoring 
Trim/draft optimisation 
Speed reduction due to port efficiency – Just in Time 
arrival 
Raising crew awareness & energy efficiency training 
Efficient voyage execution -Voyage planning & DWT 
utilisation 
Optimisation of ballast voyages 
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The Gourock-Dunoon question, EU Article 82 
and its implications for Scottish ferry services 
Neil Kay, Heriot-Watt University  
 
Abstract 
The Gourock-Dunoon question can be summarised as; how can fair competition and the 
public interest be pursued and preserved on ferry services between Gourock and Dunoon? 
It is a simple question but complicated by the existence of two operators on the route, one 
private and the other publicly owned.  The paper draws on this example to argue that the 
Scottish government policy of self-funding Scottish port authorities runs the danger of 
possible breaches of EU Article 82 and that this could impact adversely on other ferry 
services in Scotland.  The paper proposes solutions that could help alleviate these dangers.  
I Introduction and background 
A story, quite possibly apocryphal, is attributed to Benjamin Disraeli who reportedly claimed 
that only three people had ever understood the Schleswig-Holstein question.  One was dead, 
one was a professor who had gone mad, and the third was Disraeli himself who had quite 
forgotten the answer (Rowley-Conwy, 2006). 
The “Gourock-Dunoon question” has pursued and frustrated a series of transport ministers 
for coming up to four decades.  As far as is known, no-one has forgotten the answer or taken 
it to the grave with them. As to the mental state of this professor, I can only refer readers to 
the succession of transport ministers who received my submissions on this matter politely 
and patiently.  They are in a much better position to judge that issue than I am.   
The basic Gourock-Dunoon question can be expressed as; how can fair competition and the 
public interest be pursued and preserved on ferry services between Gourock and Dunoon?   
It is a question that can be phrased simply, but the issues surrounding it are far more complex 
and have wider significance for the whole Scottish ferry network.  We also need to consider 
why the problem may be important and relevant in the present context.  That consideration 
falls into two parts: economic significance, and significance in the context of the financing of 
the Scottish ferry services. We discuss these issues below.       
However, I also have four other analyses of Scottish ferry policy in general and Gourock-
Dunoon in particular previously published in this Commentary (Kay, 1999, 2009, 2010, 2011).  
All are available online so I will avoid trampling over old ground as far as possible though 
most of the arguments in these analyses are still as fresh today as when the articles were 
published.   
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I note in passing that I argued in invited evidence to the Scottish Parliament in 2005 that it 
would be possible to run Scottish ferry services as state owned services (and without the 
need for tendering) as long as they complied with EU law under the Altmark conditions (see 
Kay, 2009 and 2010).      
However, the then Scottish Executive rejected these arguments on the basis of civil servant 
advice insisting that the Altmark criteria were not applicable to ferry services in Scotland.  
The tendering process went ahead and in May 2008 the European Commission announced 
an investigation into alleged State aid for Scottish ferry services on the basis that it turns out 
Altmark was applicable to Scottish ferry services – which, as I say, I had identified as an 
escape route from tendering but which the Scottish Executive’s civil servants had denied 
existed.  In fact, the then European Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot had already 
confirmed in 2007 that Altmark was indeed applicable to Scottish ferry services (Ross, 2015).    
More recently, reports suggest the Teckal exemption (BBC News, 2017) may mean that the 
CalMac network and other routes such as Gourock-Dunoon may be considered for provision 
by an in-house operator without the needs to tender.  It is also clear EU State aid and 
competition rules will still apply here, and we discuss below some of the devils hiding in the 
detail.  
The 2005-08 Altmark saga and its effects have been summarised by Ross (2015).  Whether 
the then Scottish Executive in 2005 could have fashioned an alternative to tendering under 
Altmark is a moot point – it would have required a commitment on the part of those in charge, 
and a willingness and ability to leverage and work with external competences not available 
to them in-house.    
These issues still have relevance today, both in terms of substance but also in terms of 
process. There are echoes of the Altmark debate and outcome in the submissions I have 
made to Transport Scotland and the Scottish government on the issues below for more than 
three years. We shall start by looking at the economic significance of the Gourock-Dunoon 
route in the Scottish context  
II The economic significance of Gourock-Dunoon   
Gourock and Dunoon are two communities on the Firth of Clyde about 5 miles apart and with 
populations of about 11,000 and 13,000 respectively.  They are connected by two ferry 
services.  One is a subsidised town-centre to town-centre foot passenger service operated 
by Argyll Ferries, a subsidiary of publicly owned David MacBrayne. The other is a vehicle-
carrying service operated by private operator Western Ferries.  It is generally recognised and 
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accepted by interested parties that any future vehicle-carrying service on the town-centre to 
town-centre route would have to be unsubsidised given the proximity of the private operator 
Western Ferries  
Gourock and Dunoon have importance as local centres in their own right, but their real 
significance lies in the wider geographical context in which they are set.  In that respect they 
can be viewed as the mirror image of South Queensferry and North Queensferry on the Firth 
of Forth.  The two Queensferry communities served as crucial ferry hubs for road traffic up 
and down the east coast of Scotland until the completion of the Forth Road Bridge in 1964. 
The Gourock-Dunoon ferries today play strategic and economic roles similar to those of the 
road and rail bridges on the Firth of Forth, though of course the Clyde has lesser population 
densities to the north compared to the Forth. 
This importance is reflected in Scottish transport statistics.  The private operator on the 
Gourock-Dunoon route (Western Ferries) was the busiest in Scotland in terms of passengers 
and vehicles in 2014 when it carried 1,347,200 passengers, 590,000 cars and 37,900 
commercial vehicles and buses (Transport Scotland, 2015, p145).  In that same year, 
Caledonian MacBrayne had 46 per cent and Western Ferries 24 per cent of vehicle carryings 
nationwide in Scotland. Western’s share of national traffic was fully attributable to its 
carryings on the Gourock-Dunoon route alone (Transport Scotland, 2015, p144).  
The question we now turn to is; why is Gourock-Dunoon also significant in the current 
context?  The roots of what is turning out to be a present-day twist on the Gourock-Dunoon 
problem were laid in August 2012 when it was revealed that Transport Scotland had identified 
five routes in Scotland which could be considered for separate tender (in some quarters this 
was argued to be a step towards privatisation).  Four of these routes were used by CalMac: 
Ardrossan to Brodick, Wemyss Bay to Rothesay, Oban to Craignure, and Largs to Cumbrae. 
These four routes (and in turn the harbours served) consistently figure in Scottish Transport 
Statistics as high frequency traffic and collectively they represent a substantial proportion of 
the CalMac network whether measured by revenue or volume of traffic.  State-owned 
Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd (CMAL) owns the Oban, Brodick, Wemyss Bay, Largs and 
Cumbrae harbours. Argyll and Bute Council own the Rothesay and Craignure harbours.  
Ardrossan harbour is owned by Clydeport. When the plans to open up the bundle and tender 
these routes separately were made public in 2012 there were threats of strike action alleging 
lack of assurances on pensions and working conditions (Daily Record, 2012)    
It is not clear why Transport Scotland had intended to tender some frequently used CalMac 
services individually at this point, but the European Commission certainly in its various 
investigations of Scottish ferry services down the years has consistently made it clear that 
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these services had to be administered in ways that were consistent with EU State aid and 
competition rules, and the Commission also made clear they saw competitive tendering as 
the normal mechanism to achieve this. The Commission had also made clear (including in 
their 2008 State aid investigation) that bundling of routes as in the CalMac tender could run 
the danger of concealing anti-competitive and discriminatory behaviour.      
“… some interested parties are of the view that the bundling of all routes, with the exception 
of the route between Gourock and Dunoon, unduly and significantly restrained competition 
during the tender … The Commission will need to assess the impact of the bundling on the 
tender procedure; if it were to conclude that such bundling was not justifiable, then the 
Commission would consider that the contract has not been awarded through a really open 
and non-discriminatory public procurement procedure.” (CEC 2008, para 11) 
At the same time, various Scottish administrations down the years had emphasised their 
preference, and in some cases their intentions, to keep CalMac and its services under public 
ownership. But the problem for each successive Scottish administration over the past 17 
years is that you cannot guarantee continued public ownership of these services in perpetuity 
under fairly conducted competitive tendering.  It is simply not possible to square that circle.      
A few months after the public announcement of Transport Scotland’s plans for tendering 
selected routes separately, a new CMAL system of port charges were introduced in April 
2013.  As we note below, this has major implications for the current financing and governance 
debate in the context of EU State aid and competition rules.  
III The CMAL pricing system    
In December 2012, Transport Scotland published the Scottish Government’s Scottish Ferry 
Services: Ferries Plan (2013-2022) outlining its intentions over the next the next twenty 
years.  It included looking at self-funding for harbour authorities such that:   
“Self-funding would require each harbour authority (whether CMAL, independent harbour 
trusts, local authorities or private ports) to plan their forward investment and ensure that 
harbour dues (for all users, not just ferry operators) were set at a level that enabled funds for 
planned capital works to be built up and/or for loans for such works to be paid off” (Transport 
Scotland, 2012, p.11). 
From 1st April 2013, CMAL abandoned the pier dues discount scheme for frequent users and 
moved to a non-negotiable scheme in which the pier dues were directly proportionate to the 
usage of a pier.  The result was that the charges are more closely related to the fare box 
revenues of the ferry operator than they are to the costs of providing services of the port 
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operator and was consistent with CMAL’s Strategic Plan 2012-2022 (CMAL 2012) which had 
the ambition of “making ports and harbours self-funding”1. This was followed by another 
strategic plan (CMAL 2014) which did not mention self-funding as such but makes clear that 
CMAL was following the investment priorities set out in the Transport Scotland (2012) ferry 
plan - which of course was based around self-funding.   
In principle, self-funding can sound an innocuous and reasonable proposition.  However, as 
I have argued in a series of communications to CMAL and Transport Scotland since 
November 2013, there are sound reasons to argue that self-funding a harbour authorities 
network can almost inevitably lead to breaches of EU Article 82. The problem breaks down 
into two parts, harbour authority port revenue and harbour authority port costs.  We can 
demonstrate this with a simple illustrative case.  
An illustrative case 
Suppose we have a harbour authority with a small network of four ports, A, B, C and D each 
serving separate markets. The four ports each cost the harbour authority £1 million pounds 
a year to operate and maintain. All the ports are used by similar vehicle-carrying ferries and 
the same network-wide charge is payable each time a vessel arrives at any of the four ports.  
A, B and C ports all have the same amount of usage by ferries over the course of a year, but 
Port D is used five times more frequently than any one of the other ports. You adjust the 
network charge until the network is self-financing. What revenue will you get from each of the 
ports? 
The answer is £500,000 revenue for each of ports A, B and C, and £2.5million for Port D.  
The network-wide revenue of £4million is just enough to cover the network-wide costs of £4 
million2. Port A, B, and Cs’ losses are cross-subsidised by Port Ds high frequency, high 
revenue – and highly profitable - business.  In fact, Port D’s gross profit margin is 150%.   
Established EU case law suggests that the starting point from the perspective of the 
application of EU Article 82 would be to look at Port D as a business in its own right. Two 
2004 cases CEC (2004a and b) looked at the issue of whether a port authority was indulging 
in unfair pricing practices under Article 82 of the EC Treaty which prohibits the abuse by one 
or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in substantial part 
                                                          
1 Both strategic plans were originally publicly available on the internet. But as of February 17th 2017 there was no 
mention of them on the CMAL website publications page.  The section titled “Corporate Plan and Strategic Plan” just 
has a 3-year corporate plan which does not mention self-funding. Both strategic plans are available from me on request. 
2 In practice, the port authority would likely be allowed to make a “reasonable profit” over and above covering its costs.  
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of it.  “Abuse” would amount to “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices 
or unfair trading conditions”.   
It was determined that the relevant market was the market for the provision of port services 
and facilities in the specific port transporting passengers and/or vehicles on the route in 
question (CEC 2004a)  
Further, the cases based their definition of what could constitute excessive or unfair pricing 
on a European Court of Justice ruling which judged that the amount of excess could be 
determined by looking at the profit margin resulting from the difference between the selling 
price of the product in question and its cost of production.  
The Court also determined that whether a price charged was both excessive and unfair could 
be determined by looking whether the charge imposed was either unfair in itself or when 
compared to competing products.3 
If we refer back to our illustrative case above, any operator using Port D who wished to argue 
the case that the charges levied at Port D were both excessive and unfair would start by 
pointing to a profit margin of 150% being made by the port authority at that port, with the 
surpluses being used to prop up loss-making businesses at Ports A, B and C. 
It could be argued that Ports A, B and C should be maintained and their loss making 
supported for social reasons and the needs of local communities.  That point could be fully 
conceded by the user of Port D, but the counterargument would be that if there were public 
interest reasons for maintaining ports A, B and C, then they should be subsidised from the 
public purse, not cross-subsidised through arguably excessive and unfair charges on a user 
of Port D in the distinct and separate market served by Port D. 
In our illustrative case, highly profitable port activity is used by a self-funding harbour authority 
to support loss-making ports serving separate markets in the rest of its network. In the next 
section we look at whether these issues are likely to arise in a real world Scottish context, 
starting with CMAL.  
IV Implications of CMAL’s self-funding pricing regime  
We consider the likely profit and loss implications of CMAL’s self-funding regime by treating 
each port as serving a separate and distinct market and look at the revenue and cost 
considerations in turn.  
                                                          
3 The Commission issued a short summary by Lamalle et al (2004) on the implications of the rulings.  
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
65 
 
First on CMAL’s revenue side, there are 24 CMAL-owned harbours including Gourock (which 
is used by Argyll Ferries passenger-only service).  However, Gourock alone has more 
sailings per year than the total sailings for ten of these other CMAL ports (Castlebay, Coll, 
Colonsay, Kennacraig, Kilchoan, Lochboisdale, Port Ellen, Tarbert, Tiree and Tobermory).4  
Just five of the CMAL ports (Gourock, Colintraive, Cumbrae, Largs, and Rhubodach) account 
for 61% of the sailings on the network.5 Clearly some ports would involve larger vessels and 
so higher access charges per sailings, but equally clearly this serves to illustrate the high 
degree of skewness in terms of usage at individual CMAL port facilities.6      
Second, on CMAL’s cost side, almost all CMAL’s costs are fixed costs, there are no 
significant variable costs attributable to actual usage of their facilities.  This reflects CMAL’s 
responsibilities as an asset manager, ferry operations are the operator’s responsibility with 
the operator and its employees typically also responsible for managing sailings at piers.  The 
general principle is that the nature of CMAL’s business and its remit means almost all its 
costs of providing services to users are fixed costs largely unaffected by frequency of sailings 
of volume of traffic from its ports and harbours, whether schedules are half-hourly, hourly, 
daily or weekly.  This is consistent with what the Commission found in its investigation of port 
charges under Article 82 in the cases brought by the ferry operators Scandlines and 
Sundbusserne where it said; “It should be noted that most of the costs of the port are fixed 
costs and that the variable costs (i.e. costs that would vary with the number of calls by the 
ferry operators or the number of passengers/vehicles transported on board the ferries) are 
minor” (CEC, 2004a p.27). 
This highly skewed nature of operator economic activity on the network combined with the 
(mostly) fixed costs of operating ports means that some ports would likely be highly profitable 
while others would be major loss makers.  CMAL’s self-financing regime means the latter 
would be largely financed by the former. This extreme skewness can be argued to be 
consistent with a prima facie case that the CMAL port pricing formula would almost inevitably 
lead to the issues under Article 82 as discussed in the previous section. In the next section 
we look at Gourock-Dunoon as example to see whether that would happen in practice.    
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Harbour access data supplied by CMAL for April 11 to March 2012 and published timetables.  The CMAL figures 
probably somewhat understate the frequency of the Gourock sailings, the more frequent the Argyll Ferries service only 
started in June 2011  
5 Ibid  
6 Scottish Transport Statistics indicates a similar pattern of highly skewed volumes in terms of vehicles and passengers 
carried through individual ports,  
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V The Gourock-Dunoon market and CMAL’s system of charges  
Gourock-Dunoon would be a useful indicative case simply on the basis of its economic 
importance. In addition, a recent Scottish Government commissioned MVA report (2013) on 
the route also gives precise measures for port charges that would be imposed for a vehicle-
passenger service using CMAL and council facilities, and detailed costs of port operation are 
available through different sources. It is also subject to separate tender, unlike the two largest 
tenders (Clyde and Hebrides and Northern Isles) whose routes are bundled.  
If excessive/unfair pricing can be argued here, then there are a number of CalMac routes 
using CMAL harbours which exhibit similar features to Gourock-Dunoon in terms of its being 
a high frequency and/or high value route.  These are the type of routes referred to above that 
were briefly considered for separate tender by Transport Scotland in 2012.   
The MVA report was commissioned to investigate whether a commercial (unsubsidised) 
vehicle-carrying service could be viable in the Gourock-Dunoon market where it would face 
competition from the unsubsidised operator, Western Ferries (the latter owns its own ports).  
As far as port revenues to the harbour authority are concerned, the MVA report calculated 
that a frequent (half-hourly) two vessel vehicle-passenger service between Gourock and 
Dunoon would face annual port charges of about £2m at Gourock and a slightly lower amount 
at Dunoon (the latter owned by Argyll and Bute Council).  However, that last figure has to be 
regarded as contingent since the Council has since been reviewing its harbour charge 
system for its extensive network of ports.  At the same time, it will be recalled that the Scottish 
Ferry Plan indicated that it expected self-funding to be adopted by most harbour authorities, 
including councils.  
As far as port costs for the harbour authority are concerned, the Scandlines and 
Sundbusserne cases (CEC, 2004a and b) cited the United Brands case and noted a number 
of methodologies in general and with specific reference to EU port charges to assess possible 
excessive pricing under EU Article 82.   I used three of these methodologies as alternative 
ways of assessing the costs to CMAL of running the port of Gourock, drawing on publicly 
available information, information provided by CMAL, and Freedom of Information requests.  
These methodologies produced a range of cost estimates, the highest of which was £650,000 
a year. Even if this top end estimate was adopted, it suggested a profit margin of over 200% 
for CMAL if a frequent vehicle-passenger service was to be reintroduced on the route.  The 
MVA figures suggested that these charges would severely impact on the net revenue stream 
and adversely affect the commercial risks for any operator wishing to enter this market with 
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a vehicle-carrying service. It could also arguably lead to breaches of Article 82, most 
obviously in deterring such market entry.         
By extension, these same issues should also apply to the high frequency/high value routes 
on the CalMac network where CMAL and Argyll and Bute Council are the dominant harbour 
authorities. We would expect that network charges imposed by the harbour authorities self-
funding their respective networks would reduce or eliminate the possibility of commercial 
unsubsidised vehicle carrying on these routes.  This in turn might diminish arguments that 
the CalMac network could be partially unbundled by selecting some routes for separate 
tender, such as the ones that were briefly considered for these purposes in 2012.   
I submitted my analysis in writing to the then Managing Director of CMAL and the leader of 
Argyll and Bute Council in November 2013, and since then have had meetings with the CMAL 
MD and his two successors.  However, to date these meetings have not led to any 
satisfactory conclusion.  Questions still relate to the object and the effect of harbour 
authorities self-funding regime under Article 82.  As to what its object was, we can grant good 
intentions and put down any adverse outcomes to unintended consequences.  But what 
matters here are the actual effects.  
These effects may be judged potentially severe under Article 82. Interested parties (which 
can include operators, local businesses and communities) may have grounds for claiming 
that the general impact of Scottish government’s policy of harbour authorities self-funding is 
to lead to excessive port pricing on popular high value/frequency routes and protect existing 
Scottish ferry operators by unfairly deterring market entry from other EU operators.  The 
specific operators most obviously at risk of claims of unfair protection are CalMac Ferries, 
Argyll Ferries and Western Ferries (the latter two on the Gourock-Dunoon route). 
It might further be argued that CalMac route-bundling facilitates potential abuse of this nature 
by reducing the transparency of costs and revenue streams associated with each route 
market.  This is a non-trivial danger given (as noted above) the concerns expressed by the 
Commission down the years as to the potential market distortion effects of route bundling.      
Finally, it should be noted that in the view of some interested parties, the issue of excessive 
port charges may already have had an impact in deterring potential operators from pursuing 
an interest in the Gourock-Dunoon route after Expressions of Interest were invited recently 
by Transport Scotland.  
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VI Conclusions and possible remedies    
Notwithstanding the issues outlined above, there are some straightforward remedies that can 
– and should - be applied to resolve the issues raised by the Scottish government’s policy 
that port authorities in Scotland self-fund their port networks by way of cross-subsidies and 
the competition issues these raise under Article 82.  These remedies include that:  
(1) As a prerequisite, that these issues be recognised at ministerial level of the Scottish 
Government and that action needs to be taken to resolve them.  
(2) The Scottish Government should identify a well-established and generally accepted 
methodology to assess the cost of operating and maintaining individual ports 
(including accounting for shared overheads and costs).       
(3) The chosen methodology should be adopted to assess the individual costs of ports 
operated and maintained by those harbour authorities likely to be affected by the 
above issues. 
(4) The results should be made publicly available.  
(5) It would still be possible for harbour authorities like CMAL and Argyll and Bute Council 
to operate a network-wide system of port charges.  However, that system should 
incorporate an annual system of volume-dependent ex ante discounts or ex post 
rebates to ensure that the port authority makes no more than a reasonable profit at 
individual ports.    
(6) There are likely to be public interest arguments for supporting loss making ports from 
public funds for social reasons (as in our illustrative case above).    
There are two points that should be emphasised about switching from a self-funding port 
network pricing regime to an ‘ex ante discount / ex post rebate’ one. First, its adoption may 
not actually lead to pressure to unbundle high frequency/value routes.  Underlying profitability 
of any of such routes is certainly likely to have been eroded by the rise in costs associated 
with self-funding regimes, but their profitability is also likely to have been squeezed from the 
other direction by the imposition of Road Equivalent Tariff (RET) on route revenue streams. 
However, while it has been argued here that self-funding leads to questionable outcomes 
under Article 82, RET has been applied to these routes for well-articulated and legitimate 
social reasons.  That being the case, these routes may still be commercially unprofitable 
even after a fair system of port charges is set up.  
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Second, the irony is that harbour-authorities’ self-funding is unlikely to have any significant 
net effect on the public purse, either compared to systems past or the one proposed here. 
The major impact of self-funding is that any increased port revenue to CMAL (and any other 
port authority) in terms of increased port charges just has to be met in the form of increased 
subsidy at these ports for CalMac to enable it to continue its scheduled and contracted 
operations (effectively tapping publicly-owned Peter to pay publicly-owned Paul).  Indeed if 
the potential losses in harbour fees from deterring a potential vehicle service at Gourock-
Dunoon are factored in, self-funding could actually lead to a net loss to the public purse.              
Finally, I am optimistic in principle that simple solutions compliant with EU law could be 
applied here and move things forward to a solution to the Gourock-Dunoon question.  I am 
however a realist (based on some years of experience), and in practice we can expect this 
‘can’ to be kicked down the road until the potential problems warned about here become 
actual problems.        
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Scottish ferry services’ procurement, post-
Brexit: challenge or opportunity? 
Jeanette Findlay, Dania Thomas, University of Glasgow  
 
Abstract 
In the context of a very uncertain legal and constitutional future, the issue of lifeline ferry 
service provision in Scotland is considered.  Some unintended, and negative, consequences 
of competitive tendering are set out, focussing particularly on the impact of tendering on the 
Scottish Government’s Fair Work policy and the necessity to reduce carbon emissions. The 
range of possible constitutional and legal backdrops against which Scottish ferry services will 
be provided in the future are analysed in terms of the consequences for achieving these 
objectives and a road map is constructed.  EU and Scottish public procurement legislation is 
described and their similarities are highlighted.  Should competitive tendering ultimately be 
deemed no longer necessary, the need to develop a suitable regulatory regime for a public 
sector monopoly provider is noted.  In an alternative scenario, where tendering continues, it 
is proposed that the use of Community Benefit clauses, as well as other legal instruments, 
could be used to align the outcomes of competitive tendering with specified economic and 
environmental objectives. 
I Introduction  
It is very unusual to be having to think about the economics of Scottish ferry transport 
services in the face of such constitutional and legal uncertainty, but such are the times in 
which we now operate.  Here, we set out the various potential states of the world in which 
decisions around the delivery and financing of ferry transport to Scotland’s island 
communities will have to be made.  In doing so, we flag up at least one or more of the 
discussions which will necessarily have to take place at some unspecified time in the future.  
Moreover, we highlight options which have a number of desirable features and which might 
serve as a focus in any discussions which might take place between the EU and the UK, the 
UK and Scotland or Scotland and the EU in relation to ferry transport and to the wider issue 
of public procurement. National Audit Office officials have already begun to advise that 
companies should be considering the challenges / environment they will face post-Brexit and 
arguing for specific elements in any Brexit deal that is struck.1 
These are uncertain times, but, in fact, the legal position regarding the necessity or otherwise 
of having to undertake competitive tenders for Scotland’s ferry routes has been a matter of 
uncertainty and debate for some time, in fact since 2005 and it remains so today.  This 
particular discussion is addressed in detail in John Temple Lang’s article in this issue and is 
                                                          
1 Mark Taylor, Assistant Director, Audit Scotland speaking at a conference on Brexit in Edinburgh, 2nd March 2017, 
http://www.mackayhannah.com/conferences/agenda/brexit-for-beginners  
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the subject of the review into the tendering of ferry contracts which was announced by the 
Transport Minister2 last month.  The review, which has necessitated the delaying of the 
Gourock-Dunoon tender and will, in all likelihood, delay the process for the Northern Isles 
contract, has, as its focus the question of whether a public-sector company (in this case, 
CalMac) could be directed to provide this service without the need for any further tendering.  
That possibility could have been considered at any point over the past decade or so and is 
not related to the imminence of Brexit.  It relies entirely on a known exemption from EU State 
aid rules, the Teckal exemption, which is referred to elsewhere in this issue.  The outcome 
of the review, taking place, as it does, while the UK (and Scotland with it) moves towards exit 
from the EU, will remain relevant given that procurement regulations recently enacted into 
Scots law include reference to Teckal.  If somehow Scotland manages to detach itself from 
the UK and re-attach itself to the EU, then EU law will retain its current primacy. 
In order to bring some clarity to this matter we set out below as many of the considerations 
around ferry services as we can, under each of the possible states of the world which we can 
envisage at this point.  We consider not only the matters currently under review by the 
Scottish Government, but the wider question of how to provide island communities with an 
efficient, safe, good-quality and affordable ferry service that promotes and develops the 
economic and cultural life of the islands; provides fair, good quality work for islanders and 
island and mainland communities and is environmentally sustainable.  In other words, how 
do we avoid the unintended consequences of a system (competitive tendering) which is 
designed mainly to promote efficiency (more or less narrowly defined) and which can, and 
does, interact negatively with other well-established public policy aims of the current Scottish 
Government and all likely successors for some time to come. 
II Background to tendering of ferry services in Scotland 
It is not necessary here to rehearse the full history of competitive tendering of Scottish ferry 
services as this is well-known and documented in a variety of journal and newspaper articles.  
Central to our discussion here is the largely undisputed proposition that the existing service 
in the Clyde and Hebrides – the largest of the bundled routes - is a well-run, efficient and 
cost-effective service provided by the public-sector operator, CalMac (Findlay, J, 2005, 2010, 
2016).  Moreover, given the tightly-specified tender and the over-arching regulatory 
environment in which the service operates, there is very little scope for cost-saving. In 
particular, the vessels, timetable and staffing are largely pre-determined and any cost-saving 
could only come in terms of a deterioration in the terms and conditions of on and off--shore 
CalMac employees.  More up-to-date evidence will soon be provided by the National Audit 
                                                          
2 http://www.transport.gov.scot/news/review-ferry-tendering 
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Office, which will publish an audit of ferry services in Scotland in the autumn of 2017.  This 
audit will ‘…examine spending on ferries and what this achieves, to help establish whether it 
provides value for money’.3 
The role of previous tenders in achieving a well-run, cost-effective ferry service is arguable 
but, on any view, it is undisputed that tendering itself is an extremely costly affair (ibid) and 
that a continuation of the tendering regime is unlikely to provide any benefits to service users 
in terms of quality nor achieve any cost-saving in the running of the service. Moreover, as 
discussed elsewhere in this issue, it can have a negative impact on the achievement of 
environmental policy targets and, in practice, can cut across the Fair Work policy agenda by 
endangering the existence of the public operator (Findlay, J, 2016) or by forcing tendering 
authorities to shoehorn Fair Work into a process not primarily designed for this purpose and 
subject to a degree of uncertainty (Findlay, P, 2017).   
As noted above, successive Scottish Governments (and the previous Scottish Executive) 
have not challenged these arguments but have, instead, indicated repeatedly that tendering 
is required by EU regulation and is not their preferred option.  So the question arises as to 
which of the possible circumstances which might arise in the short to medium term would 
allow the Scottish Government to provide ferries without the need to put them out to 
competitive tender and thereby avoid the unintended, negative consequences referred to 
above - and outlined in more detail in this issue and elsewhere (Findlay, J, 2016, 
Rehmatullah, 2017).    Furthermore, were such circumstances to arise, then how should such 
public monopolies be regulated to ensure quality of service, cost-effectiveness, 
environmental sustainability, fair work and any other policy objectives that may be set by the 
Scottish Government? 
III Competitive tendering and Scotland’s current position within the EU 
The following discussion relates to the current status of the UK as an EU member state.   
Notwithstanding the UK Parliament’s Article 50 vote, EU regulations are likely to apply in the 
UK for at least two years and probably longer.  The decision by the First Minister to seek the 
approval of the Scottish Parliament to begin negotiations with the UK government on a 
second independence referendum, raises the possibility that Scotland may remain in the EU 
after Brexit and into the foreseeable future.   
The requirement of EU member states to engage in a competitive tendering process is 
considered in detail in this issue by Temple Lang (2017).  This includes the question of 
whether the Altmark judgement would have allowed the Scottish Government to direct 
                                                          
3 http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/report/ferry-services-in-scotland 
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CalMac, or to direct and subsidise a private operator, to run Scotland’s ferry services without 
contravening the State aid rules.  Temple Lang concludes that indeed it might have, if the 
public service obligation had been properly specified and the level of compensation had been 
transparently and objectively calculated.  However, successive Scottish Governments have 
chosen not to attempt this and have relied instead on competitive tendering, with all its 
consequent costs. 
The Scottish Government review of tendering which is currently underway is considering the 
question of whether or not another judgement, which gave rise to the Teckal exemption, 
applies in the case of Scottish ferry services.  In plain speech, the Teckal exemption allows 
for a public authority in a member State to procure directly from a company which is solely 
directed by that authority (as though it were a department of that authority) and which carries 
out eighty percent or more of its activities for the procuring authority.  If Teckal applies, then 
the Scottish Government could simply direct CalMac (which is wholly-owned by Scottish 
Ministers and is primarily engaged in servicing Scottish routes on their behalf) to provide ferry 
services on any or all of the current or future routes.  Clearly such a finding would remove 
the need for a competitive tendering process, although some other method of regulation 
would presumably be required to replace that provided, in theory, by the forces of 
competition.  We return to this question below when we consider the constitutional outcome 
preferred by the UK Government ie that Scotland remains in the UK and the UK leaves the 
EU. 
IV Scottish / EU procurement legislation 
In 2014, the Scottish Parliament introduced the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act followed 
by two pieces of associated regulation in 2015 and 20164.  These implemented the relevant 
EU Directives on public procurement.  It is important to state that neither the 2014 Act nor 
the Regulations mandate that the contracting authority award public contracts through 
competitive tendering. Section 14 of the 2014 Act, for instance, recognises that the Scottish 
Government ‘may, by regulations, specify circumstances in which a contracting authority may 
…award a regulated contract without seeking offers in relation to the proposed contract.’  
Regulation 6 of the 2016 regulations also specifies other circumstances in which contracts 
can be awarded without competition.5  
 
                                                          
4 Procure Reform (Scotland) Act 2014; Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015 and The Procurement (Scotland) 
Regulations 2016 accessed at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
5 Section 14 of the Act of 2014.  
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In another significant development, Regulation 13 of the 2015 regulations confirms the 
Teckal exemption referred to above.6 
 
The 2015, 2016 Regulations and the 2014 Act apply to all new tender processes starting 
after the date on which these came into effect (April 2016) with the important provision that 
the law now embeds a strong theme of social responsibility. In the case of the provision of 
ferry services through competitive tendering, the Act provides several grounds on which this 
form of procurement can be challenged. This statutory intent is set out in Part 2 ‘General 
Duties and Procurement Strategies’. This is combined with detailed set of remedies that are 
available to challenge the decisions of the contracting authority in situations where it is not 
compliant with its general duties.7  This requires mandatory compliance with the ‘sustainable 
procurement duty’8 which includes a duty to ‘consider how in conducting the procurement 
process it can – improve the economic, social and environmental well-being of the authority’s 
area.’9  Further, in any preceding financial year the procurement strategy developed by the 
contracting  authority must  ‘set out how the authority intend to ensure that its regulated 
procurements will …deliver value for money.. include a statement of the authority’s general 
policy on the use of community benefit requirements, consulting and engaging with those 
affected by procurement, the payment of a living wage to persons involved in producing, 
providing or constructing the subject matter of regulated procurement...’.10  The 2015 
Regulations also permit the contracting authority to refuse to award a contract to the tenderer 
submitting the ‘most economically advantageous tender’ in situations where ‘the authority 
has established that the tender does not comply with applicable obligations in the fields of 
environmental, social and labour law established by EU law, national law, collective 
agreements or by the international environmental, social and labour law provisions.’11  The 
Regulations have also incorporated a new ground for exclusion which deals with breaches 
of social, environmental and employment law obligations. In situations where ‘a contracting 
authority can demonstrate by any appropriate means that a business has breached one of 
these obligations, it may, at its discretion, choose to exclude that business from bidding for 
contracts.’12  So we can see that in many of the respects relevant to this discussion, Scottish 
procurement law mirrors existing EU law. 
 
                                                          
6 Regulation 13 of 2015 Regulations 
7 Section 8 of the Act sets out the General Duties of a contracting authority. 
8 Section 9 sets out the sustainable procurement duty   
9 Section 9 (1)(a)(i) of the 2014 Act 
10 Section  15 (5) of the 2014 Act 
11 Regulation 57 (2) of the 2015 Regulations 
12 Point 9.15 of the Policy Note accompanying the 2015 Regulations 
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In addition to the statutory provisions, the contracting authority may impose a community 
benefit requirement as a term of the contract relating to training and recruitment that is 
‘intended to improve the economic, social or environmental wellbeing of the authority’s area  
in a way additional to the main purpose of the contract in which the requirement is  included.’13 
This is not a mandatory requirement and the Scottish Government reserves its right to publish 
guidance on the use of ‘community benefit requirements’.14  This is discussed in more detail 
in relation to Fair Work in the paper by Patricia Findlay in this issue (Findlay, P, op cit). 
 
The Future Islands Bill15, which is due to be introduced in the Scottish Parliament in Spring 
2017 is likely, based on the consultation which was undertaken as part of the process for 
introducing the Bill, to include a requirement to have a National Islands Plan; to require 
‘island-proofing’ of all legislation, policy and services and to provide a range of measures to 
‘empower island communities’ in relation to, among other things, service delivery. 
 
Taken together, this suite of legislation/regulation could form the basis of a new approach to 
the delivery of ferry services which is both compliant with EU and Scots Law and would allow 
a more direct approach to ensuring that ferry operator(s) not only provide a good quality, 
environmentally sustainable, service but also provide good quality employment conditions 
and thereby contribute to the strength of island economies.  So where does that leave us 
now? 
 
Figure 1 sets out a road map of possible outcomes conditional on whichever constitutional 
position Scotland finds itself.  Based on current EU and Scots Law and in both of the 
circumstances currently envisaged, an important question is whether or not the Teckal 
exemption is deemed by the current Scottish Government review to apply to ferry services in 
Scotland. 
 
  
                                                          
13 Section 24 of the 2014 Act. 
14Section 26 of the 2014 Act. 
15 https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/islands-team/islands-bill-consultation/  
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Firstly, we shall consider the state of the world in which the exemption is not deemed to apply 
(the left hand side of the diagram).  In this case, competitive tendering is likely to still be 
required whether or not, Scotland remains in the EU.  However, there are a number of routes 
whereby the tendering authority ie the Scottish Government, could incorporate other policy 
objectives, including the ones considered here, into a tender document.  These include, but 
are not confined to, the use of Community Benefit Clauses, the Sustainable Procurement 
Duty and relevant elements of the Future Islands Bill when it becomes law.  Moreover, in the 
selection of the successful bidder, the contracting authority could, as explained by John 
Temple Lang (2017), select the one which was deemed to be the ‘most economically 
advantageous’, which is not necessarily the lowest-cost bid. This could lead to the 
achievement of the relevant policy objectives, although that outcome is not certain, relies on 
the political will of the Scottish Government of the day and could be subject to challenge (we 
denote this in the diagram with a broken arrow connector). 
 
If the review finds that the Teckal exemption applies to Scottish ferry services (the right hand 
side of the diagram), then this opens up the possibility of the contract being awarded 
permanently to an in-house operator (i.e. CalMac).  In this situation, the Scottish Government 
could simply direct CalMac to comply with and meet all objectives set out by them.  Clearly 
in this case, a system of regulation – over and above all other existing safety and 
environmental regulations – would have to be instituted.  Neil Kay in a paper written in a 
previous Fraser Economic Commentary (Kay, 2009) discusses this very issue.  He argued 
that Scottish civil servants were inexperienced in regulating public-sector monopolies 
because this particular task in the 1980s and 1990s fell under the remit of UK civil servants.  
However, a wealth of experience has now been accumulated in this area and it should be 
perfectly possible to devise a suitable regulatory framework and to find sufficient expertise 
in-house and externally to operate it.  Work on developing such a framework should be a 
priority for Transport Scotland, and interested academics, given the strong possibility of it 
becoming necessary.   
 
It should be noted that we have not taken into account another possible change in the rules 
which might affect this discussion.  In April 2018, the European Single Procurement Directive 
will become mandatory in Scotland.  This Directive provides an easier procedure16 for bidders 
throughout the EU to be short-listed for public contracts, provided they demonstrate their 
standing, technical capacity and experience.  In previous ferry tendering exercises, there 
                                                          
16 Point 9.21 of the Policy Note to the 2015 Regulations 
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have been very few bidders from the UK or the EU.  This new Directive may make such bids 
a more attractive proposition, but it is too early to be sure about the possible effects. 
V Conclusion  
The provision and financing of lifeline ferry services in Scotland is a matter of great 
importance to island communities and their fellow-citizens in the mainland port areas.  The 
ferry industry provides much more than simply transport services; it provides employment 
opportunities and training and constitutes a vital lifeline connecting the fragile island 
economies to that of mainland Scotland.  It is also the vehicle whereby policies as diverse as 
carbon reduction and fair work can be delivered to islanders and the wider Scottish labour 
market. 
The considerable constitutional and legal uncertainties surrounding the future of the industry 
is likely to persist for some time.  In an attempt to bring some clarity to the matter, we have 
set out the possible outcomes which will arise out of the current review of ferry tendering and, 
in particular, we map out the ways in which other policy objectives of the Scottish Government 
might be more effectively achieved in the short to medium term, conditional on the outcome 
of its current review of whether ferry services require to be competitively tendered. 
While acknowledging the inherent uncertainties, it must also be acknowledged that 
opportunities are opening up to achieve a number of policy objectives in a more direct way.  
Should the review conclude that tendering is not necessary, the service can lawfully be 
provided by a public-sector provider under the direction of the Scottish Government.  In such 
circumstances, policies such as fair work and the environmental objectives outlined in this 
issue (Rehmatullah, 2017) could be pursued as an integral part of the aims of the operator 
under a suitable – and new - regulatory regime. 
However, should the review come to the opposite conclusion, there are still several 
mechanisms embedded in Scots and EU law which would provide the means to pursue those 
same objectives, albeit with less certainty of achieving them. 
There are strong economic arguments for arranging matters in such a way as to utilise ferry 
services as a means to achieve a variety of desirable policy aims.  As indicated here, there 
are likely to be legal avenues to pursue these aims under most states of the world we can 
envisage – subject always to there being the political will to do so.  In the meantime, research 
and policy activity should be directed towards examining in greater detail the precise ways in 
which this can be implemented. 
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Business investment performance in Scotland 
Kenny Richmond & Jennifer Turnbull, Scottish Enterprise 
 
Abstract 
Business investment (including spending on machinery, buildings, ICT, R&D) is a key driver 
of productivity.  New data shows that Scotland’s business investment rate has been lower 
than nearly all other OECD countries for a number of years, resulting in a low level of capital 
stock per worker.  Scotland’s low business investment is likely due to a number of factors, 
including: industrial structure: a small manufacturing sector and larger public sector; weak 
business R&D expenditure; low levels of competition, reducing the incentives to invest: 
management short-termism in some companies; low productivity reducing potential returns 
from investment; and, low wage growth reducing the cost of labour relative to capital.   
Business investment by Scottish-owned companies appears to be particularly low. Low 
business investment is likely a major reason for Scotland’s low productivity levels and growth. 
 
I Introduction 
Business investment - in machinery, buildings, ICT, R&D etc. - is a key driver of productivity, 
competitiveness and economic growth. This paper uses new Scottish Government data that 
allows, for the first time, a more robust assessment of Scotland’s business investment 
performance and how it compares to other OECD economies.  
II Why is business investment important? 
Business investment is defined as expenditure on1: 
 transport equipment 
 information and communication technology (ICT) equipment 
 other machinery and equipment 
 cultivated assets (livestock for breeding, tree plantations etc.)  
 intellectual property products (including investment in software, research & 
development, artistic originals and mineral exploration) 
 buildings and other structures. 
Research shows that business investment is essential to improving labour productivity2. 
Investment in ICT, software, machinery & equipment and R&D allows the adoption and 
diffusion of new technologies, which are crucial to increasing labour efficiency and 
productivity. Through investment, workforces can be equipped with the latest technologies, 
which, in turn, allow them to improve their business processes and produce more and higher-
                                                          
1 ONS, Business Investment in the UK 
2 The UK Productivity Puzzle, Bank of England (2014)  
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quality goods and services per unit of input3. Investment can increase the levels of capital 
stock per worker, and industries with a larger stock of capital per worker tend to have higher 
levels of productivity4 (e.g. chemical manufacturing etc.). 
III Scotland’s business investment performance 
Figure 1:  Business investment in Scotland, £m (2015 prices) and relative to GDP  
 
New data from the Scottish Government allows an assessment of business investment 
trends since 19985. In real terms (i.e. taking into account inflation), Scotland’s business 
investment has ranged from £9.3bn a year to £12.3bn - and was £12.2bn in 2015, the latest 
year of data. Business investment fell following the financial crisis and only returned to pre-
crisis levels in 2015. However, relative to the size of the Scottish economy, business 
investment is lower than pre-2001 levels. 
By comparing business investment relative to an economy’s GDP (the business investment 
rate), performance across countries can be assessed. The data shows that Scotland’s 
business investment rate (7.7%) is the second lowest across all OECD countries - the UK 
also performs poorly. This has been the case for quite a number of years; in 2004 Scotland 
also had the second lowest business investment rate. Scotland has, however, narrowed the 
                                                          
3 Investment and Productivity, Conference Board of Canada  
4 Economic Review, ONS (2014)  
5 The data has been included in the Quarterly National Accounts Scotland Quarter 1 2016 publication, and are classed 
as ‘Experimental’ (Table X1)   
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business investment rate performance gap with both the UK and OECD averages since 2004 
(by 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points respectively). 
For Scotland to match the OECD top quartile average performance, business investment in 
Scotland would need to be £10bn a year more, 90% higher than it is currently; and to match 
the UK rate, it would need to be £2b a year more, or 20% higher than at present. 
To illustrate the size of this business investment ‘gap’ – and excluding self-employed 
businesses – a business with 50 employees would need to invest an additional £55,000 
investment per annum to match the average UK business investment rate, and fully £270,000 
per annum to match the OECD Q1 average. 
 
Figure 2:  Business investment relative to GDP (%), Scotland and OECD, 2014 
 
Scotland’s low business investment rate over a number of years relative to other countries 
suggests that the level of capital stock per worker is also lower, negatively affecting 
productivity performance.  
IV Reasons for Scotland’s low business investment rate? 
There are a number of potential reasons for Scotland’s low business investment rate 
compared to other EU and OECD countries. 
Industrial structure 
Countries with a larger manufacturing sector (relative to the overall economy) tend to have 
higher business investment rates, as R&D and capital equipment spend tends to be higher 
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in manufacturing than in services companies6.  Scotland has a smaller manufacturing sector 
than many other OECD countries. However, even when compared to countries with a similar 
sized manufacturing sector, Scotland’s business investment rate is still considerably lower.  
 
Figure 3:  Business investment rates for countries with similar-sized manufacturing sectors, 
2014 
 
Research by Scottish Enterprise7 on Scotland’s manufacturing sector highlights that 
companies in Scotland typically invest less in capital equipment than those in other countries, 
particularly smaller and medium-sized businesses which make up most of Scotland’s 
manufacturing base.  This is due to a number of factors:  
 Scottish companies generally “sweat their capital assets” for longer periods with 
investment spend tending to be focused on maintenance, repair and 
improvement of existing capital assets rather than on acquiring new more 
productive assets. 
 Scottish companies tend to face a different return on investment (ROI) 
parameters for capital expenditure with a shorter payback period being than that 
faced by companies in other countries, who take a longer term approach to 
investment. 
 The culture of ‘early sell-on’ in some Scottish companies limits a longer term 
outlook and, therefore, commitment to capital investment. 
                                                          
6 Economic Outlook, OECD 2015  
7 Scottish manufacturing research study, Scottish Enterprise (2014) 
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 Investing in the right capital expenditure confidently and consistently needs to be 
based on coherent and robust long term business planning; this is a gap in many 
Scottish SMEs. 
 Reluctance by a number of companies to take on long term debt.  
 
There is some evidence that, for the UK as a whole, investment by the manufacturing sector 
in ICT is similar to other countries8, and if this is the same for Scotland, it suggests that it is 
low investment in physical machinery and equipment and in R&D that is pulling down 
Scotland’s overall business investment rate.  
Low R&D spend 
 
Figure 4: Business R&D expenditure relative to GDP (%), 2014 
 
R&D expenditure is a component of overall business investment (generally between 10% 
and 20% for many countries).  Scotland’s business R&D performance lags most other OECD 
countries and is at the bottom of the third quartile. Reasons include Scotland having a smaller 
manufacturing sector compared to other countries (R&D tends to be concentrated in 
manufacturing) and having few companies in high R&D intensive sectors (such as 
automotives and electronics). As with overall business investment, Scotland’s business R&D 
rate has been low for a number of years. 
                                                          
8 Short-termism, impatient capital and finance for manufacturing innovation in the UK, UK Government Office for 
Science (2013) 
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Weaker competition 
Scotland has fewer businesses per head of population than most other EU countries.  
Moreover, a lower proportion of Scottish companies export overseas. This may reduce their 
exposure to higher levels of competition and therefore reduce their incentive to invest to meet 
such competition. Also, the public sector makes up a slightly higher proportion of the 
economy in Scotland than some other OECD countries9 (measured in terms of employment); 
economies with a larger public sector - and hence a smaller private sector - tend to have a 
lower business investment rate10. 
Management short termism and ‘shareholder value’ 
Research shows that investment levels are significantly higher in privately-owned companies 
than publicly-listed ones with the same characteristics11 and a number of studies have 
concluded that this is a result of ‘short termism’ within management teams.  This, it is argued, 
is due to ‘shareholder primacy’ where managers put the interests of shareholders first. This 
can result management teams focusing on maximising the short term value of shares and 
dividends at the expense of longer term investment12.  
An example of this is the use of profits for ‘share buy-backs’ in order to boost share prices, 
or to pay dividends, rather than to fund capital investment as although investment can 
improve a company’s long-term performance, in the short-term it can result in a decline in a 
company’s share price13. Management remuneration schemes can further incentivise a focus 
on short-term share performance14.  
There is a view that ‘the mantra of shareholder value’ has gone further in the UK than other 
countries, and that management teams pay (in particular bonuses) is more closely linked to 
short term profits than elsewhere15. 
There is limited data on the number of companies in Scotland that are publicly-listed. The 
business database FAME identifies 94 publicly-listed companies that are headquartered or 
have a registered office in Scotland. Of these, 71 employ almost 525,000 people, although a 
number are likely to be employed outside Scotland16. So although an exact figure is not 
available, it does suggest that perhaps a relatively large proportion of private sector activity 
                                                          
9 Government at a Glance, OECD 2015 and Public sector employment in the UK, ONS  
10 Source: SE analysis of OECD data 
11 Who owns a company? Bank of England 2015  
12 Who owns a company? Bank of England 2015 
13 Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms and consequences, Ernst & Young  
14 Overcoming Short-termism within British Business, Labour Policy Review (2013)  
15 Britain is held back by its business culture, not the EU, Centre for European Reform (2013)  
16 Data was not available for the other 24. FAME does not provide a geographical breakdown of the location of 
companies’ employment. 
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in Scotland is within publicly-listed or owned companies that are more liable perhaps to the 
short termism noted above.  
New research by the Bank of England17 further highlights extent of short-termism. Of 1,200 
UK companies they surveyed, three-quarters put investment behind distribution to 
shareholders and investment in financial assets when assessing the most important use of 
internally generated funds. A third of companies reported they had invested too little in recent 
years, and many of these reported constraints on using internal rather than external funds 
(ie using profits) for investment rather than for distribution to shareholders or purchasing 
financial assets (including M&A).  
Research by McKinsey18 of US companies suggests that those that take a ‘long-term view’ 
invested more than their ‘short-term’ peers, and reported better performance on measures 
such as revenue, jobs and earnings growth, and has less revenue volatility. This highlights 
the benefits to companies that focus on long-term investment. 
Low productivity and wage growth 
The UK (and Scotland’s) relatively weak productivity (both growth and level) compared to 
some other countries may be a factor in deterring investment if future returns (profits) are 
expected to be low. Also, recent weak wage growth following the recession has reduced the 
cost of labour relative to capital, and this may have led some businesses to actively use more 
labour-intensive forms of production rather than investing in capital19.   
Low business investment by indigenous businesses 
For the UK as a whole, tangible capital investment (so excluding Intellectual Property (IP) 
and R&D spend) by foreign-owned businesses accounts for a significant proportion (28%) of 
total business investment; this is higher than in many other OECD countries20.  It is likely to 
be similar for Scotland21.  
The business investment rate in the UK and Scotland is lower than in most other countries, 
and a high proportion of the business investment that is undertaken is by foreign-owned 
businesses.  This suggests that investment in the UK and Scotland by domestically-owned 
businesses is particularly weak compared to other countries. For example, we know that for 
                                                          
17  The financial system and productive investment: new survey evidence, Bank of England 2017  
18 Where companies with a long-term view outperform their peers, McKinsey 2017 
19 The great British jobs and productivity mystery, Royal Economic Society 2014 
20 Economic Outlook, OECD 2015 
21 Data for Scotland is not available. 
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business R&D in Scotland, 68% is carried out by overseas-owned companies22 despite them 
accounting for just 35% of Scotland’s GVA23.  
 
Figure 5: Tangible capital investment by foreign owned businesses as % total business 
investment, 2012 
 
There are, therefore, likely to be a number of reasons for Scotland’s low business investment 
rate compared to nearly all other OECD countries: 
 Scotland’s small manufacturing sector, relative to the overall economy 
 Scotland’s relatively large public sector, compared to many other countries 
 Low R&D investment, particularly by Scottish-owned businesses 
 Weak competition reducing the incentives to invest 
 Management team short-termism in some companies, particularly publicly-owned 
ones. 
 Low wage growth, reducing the cost of labour relative to capital. 
 Low business investment by Scottish-owned businesses. 
 
Investment in intangible ‘knowledge based capital’  
Research shows that investment by businesses in intangible ‘knowledge based capital’ such 
brand equity, design, human capital development, training and organisational capital is 
important to economic and productivity growth24. 
                                                          
22 Scottish Government  
23 Who owns businesses in the UK? ONS  
24 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2013  
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Investment in intangible knowledge based assets in the UK is higher than most other OECD 
countries25, and this may reflect that the service sector here accounts for a higher proportion 
of the economy. It is likely that Scottish rates of intangible investment are around the same 
level as the UK’s as Scotland’s economic structure is broadly similar to that of the UK.  
However, it is unclear the extent to which higher intangible investment offsets weak tangible 
and R&D investment in terms of the UK’s productivity performance. 
 
Figure 6: Investment in intangible knowledge assets (brand equity, design, human capital  
development, training and organisation capital) as % of industry sector GVA, 2013 
 
V Conclusions and implications for Scotland 
This new data allows, for the first time, a more robust assessment of Scotland’s poor 
business investment performance. They show that Scotland’s business investment rate has 
lagged that of the UK and other OECD countries for many years – and that the gap between 
Scotland and the better performing OECD countries is very significant.  
As a result, the level of accumulated capital stock per employee in Scotland is very likely to 
be lower than in other countries thereby negatively affecting both the competitiveness and 
productivity performance of many Scottish companies.  
                                                          
25 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2013  and OECD Science, Technology and Industry 
Scoreboard, 2015 
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The data does not allow a detailed assessment of business investment activity (for example, 
by sector or business size), but the available evidence suggests a range of potential causes 
of Scotland’s relatively poor performance including its industrial structure (relatively small 
manufacturing and relatively large public sector), low R&D, weak inter-firm competition and 
short-termism among some management teams in Scotland’s publically-owned – and large 
- companies. 
Policy implications and responses 
Scottish Enterprise supports businesses to invest; its Account Management support raises 
business growth ambition and helps businesses realise their growth plans through increased 
innovation, internationalisation, and business efficiency, which in turn help stimulate 
business investment.  
For Scotland’s industrial sector, the Manufacturing Action Plan26 sets out a number of key 
actions to encourage and support investment. This includes growing the ambition and 
strategic skills of business leaders and management teams to increase investment; 
developing workforce skills to better use and deploy technology and equipment; promoting 
the productivity benefits of investing in modern and more energy-efficient equipment and 
SMART manufacturing technologies; and supporting and encouraging increased innovation 
and R&D.  
As part of the Action Plan, the Scottish Manufacturing Advisory Service (SMAS) has 
launched the Manufacturing Capital Asset Review service to assist companies to assess the 
benefits of investing in advanced manufacturing technologies and equipment, and providing 
investment case support. This includes financial readiness support to help secure investment 
from funders. SMAS aims to complete over 600 reviews over the three years to 2020. The 
benefits of these reviews, in terms of increased business investment, will be monitored over 
time. 
Other examples of support to encourage Scotland’s businesses to invest include grants such 
as Regional Selective Assistance, Environmental Aid, property support, as well as access to 
funding support, for example through Scottish Investment Bank funds. Over the past three 
years (2013/4 to 2015/16), Scottish Enterprise support has resulted in over £830m of planned 
capital expenditure by Scottish businesses. 
R&D support to companies includes grants and the key sector funding programmes (such as 
the Renewable Energy Investment Fund), and the development of sector assets - such as 
the Scottish Innovation Centres and the Advanced Forming Research Centre (AFRC) - that 
                                                          
26 Scotland's manufacturing action plan  
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attract and stimulate business R&D. Over the past three years (2013/4 to 2015/16), Scottish 
Enterprise support has resulted in almost £495m of planned R&D expenditure by Scottish 
businesses. 
This suggests that on an annual basis, Scottish Enterprise direct capital and R&D support 
has increased business investment in Scotland by around £450m a year, contributing 3.5% 
- 4% to overall Scottish business investment. However, Scottish Enterprise support alone will 
not make a significant impact in closing Scotland’s business investment performance gap 
with other EU or OECD countries. 
To achieve such a step change in Scotland’s business investment rate would require 
significant growth in R&D and capital investment, in particular by Scotland’s domestically-
owned companies. Were this to happen, it would raise capital stock levels, positively 
contributing to productivity. More businesses need to be encouraged to take a longer term 
view and invest in new technology, machinery and equipment rather than ‘sweating’ existing 
assets, and to invest in R&D and innovation to improve processes and introduce new 
products and services. Raising the ambition and skills of management teams to develop and 
implement long-term growth plans, and to recognise the long-term benefits of business 
investment, will be key to closing Scotland’s business investment performance gap. 
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Broadband in Scotland: broader, faster, poorer, 
remoter 
Ewan Sutherland  
 
Abstract 
The provision of universal broadband Internet access in Scotland has been the subject of 
political promises, to support economic growth and reduce social divides. The market 
supplying broadband is subject to complex, multi-tiered governance. Until the UK leaves the 
EU, it is subject to EU aspirations, directives and regulations, which are implemented in 
London by the UK government and regulatory authority. There are strong path dependencies, 
arising from the Openreach agreement on wholesale access, between the regulator and BT, 
which affects both the residential and business markets. Competition in fixed broadband is 
primarily service-based and dependent on regulation. Mobile broadband has limited 
infrastructure-based competition, with incentives from UK government to extend coverage. 
State aid has been provided by complex means to support increased rural provision, but has 
not been ended, in favour of cross-subsidies. Those disinclined to use the Internet are being 
encouraged to do so, by local initiatives, partly to ease the digital by default strategy for 
government services. Brexit brings the possibility of change, by leaving the EU governance 
system, while the possibility of Scottish independence would require an entirely new system 
of market governance.  
Keywords: Broadband, Governance, Internet, State Aid, Telecommunications  
I Introduction 
The challenges in delivering universal broadband have increased significantly.1 The 
goalposts have been moved by imperfectly predictable technological advances and 
unexpected changes to the politico-regulatory landscape, with Brexit removing the United 
Kingdom from the single European regulatory space, and with the possibility of a second 
Scottish independence referendum that might or might not return it there. The capacity of 
Scottish Ministers to influence broadband markets and to improve the availability of services 
has been overstated, with consequences for economic growth and productivity. 
Despite telecommunications and Internet access being reserved matters, on which the 
Scottish Parliament cannot legislate, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has promised world 
class infrastructure, services accessible “any time, any place, anywhere”,2 and superfast 
broadband to 100 per cent of premises by 2021.3 For the most part delivery relies on policies 
and regulatory frameworks developed in Brussels and implemented in Westminster and 
Whitehall, to which Scottish Ministers add little, if any, value and over which they have 
                                                          
1 For an earlier review see Sutherland (2012). 
2 This is taken from a 1980s advert for Martini see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bF1lUGpQO-o 
3 Superfast is a download speed of up to 24 Megabits per second (Mbps). 
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uncertain influence. For example, the Scottish Parliament recently inquired into spending of 
£136 million on broadband for remote areas, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer was 
announcing £1 billion for ultrafast broadband and related infrastructure (HM Treasury, 2016; 
REC, 2016). At the same time, the UK Digital Economy Bill will remove Scottish Ministers 
from the support for rural superfast broadband, presently delivered with state aid from HM 
Treasury and the European Union (EU), switching to a system of cross-subsidies, in which 
urban residents will pay towards the higher costs of those living in rural areas, managed by 
OFCOM.4 The single United Kingdom market is constrained by the path dependencies 
arising from successive EU and UK legislation, policies and regulatory decisions, especially 
the Openreach Agreement between BT and OFCOM. 
The Internet has almost become ubiquitous, with invitations to follow ‘celebrities’ on 
Instagram, to ‘like’ Police Scotland on Facebook, to exercise with your personal trainer on 
Snapchat, and to watch programmes on the BBC TV iPlayer, while courses are taught and 
jobs are advertised on-line. The Internet of Things (IoT) extends networks beyond people to 
encompass ‘smart’ cars, domestic appliances, factories, homes, meters, and wearables, 
including clothing, connected directly or via sensors (HMG, 2014a; RAND Europe, 2014; 
OFCOM, 2015a; PAC, 2014; BEREC, 2016). Cisco (2016) reports massive growth in Internet 
traffic and forecasts yet more, the annual total for global Internet Protocol (IP) traffic 
exceeded one Zettabyte (ZB) in 2016, and is forecast to reach 2.3 ZB by 2020.5 These 
developments are built on a global market, with network and scale economies, which could 
be threatened by any disruption to globalisation, such as the imposition of trade barriers. 
A major consideration for governments has been the link between broadband and economic 
growth, justifying interventions in national markets, the creation of national plans, and the 
provision of state aid (Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer, & Woessmann, 2011; OECD, 2011; Arvin 
& Pradhan, 2014). The Internet is considered a general purpose technology (GPT), one that 
can be used across the full range of the economy for innovation that can disrupt, eliminate 
or transform established activities and businesses (Clarke, Qiang, & Xu, 2015; Liao, Wang, 
Lic, & Weyman-Jones, 2016). Skills are central to those innovations and their adoption, 
raising questions about the availability of a skilled workforce and training for citizens (Ekos 
Ltd, 2014; Select Committee on Digital Skills, 2015; Science and Technology Committee, 
2016). The importance of Internet access has been stressed by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), both for growth and economic competitiveness (Baller, Dutta, & Lanvin, 2016), 
though since rival nations are similarly engaged in deploying networks and improving skills, 
                                                          
4 The report stage in the House of Lords began on 22 February 2017. http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2016-
17/digitaleconomy.html 
5 1 ZB = 1021 bytes or 1billion Terabytes. 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
95 
 
 
it is a strategic or unavoidable necessity, something all nations must have. Like the Tour de 
France, it is a long and gruelling race, in which careful planning, strenuous training and 
physical exertion are required, merely to maintain a position in the broadband peloton.6 
The next section outlines the complex pre-Brexit system of multi-tiered governance of 
telecommunication markets. This is followed by analyses of the markets for retail and 
business broadband, then mobile broadband. The provision and use of state aid is then 
reviewed. The next sections review adoption of broadband in general and specifically in 
Glasgow. Finally, conclusions are drawn and issues identified for further research. 
II Multi-tiered governance 
The EU has set an ambitious goal for economic growth from completion of its digital single 
market (DSM), to add €415 billion annually to its gross domestic product (GDP) (EC, 2015). 
As a form of European nation building, it expects fixed and mobile broadband networks to 
become very widely accessible (see Table 1), including making €500 million available in 
loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB, 2016). It is also promoting a collaborative 
economy, in which businesses use platforms to create marketplaces for individuals to offer 
the temporary use of goods and services (EC, 2016a).   
 
Until the completion of Brexit, the governance of telecommunications markets in the United 
Kingdom remains part of the multi-tiered EU system, with ministers, regulators and civil 
servants engaged in European regulatory networks (ERNs) (Maggetti, 2014),  and bound by 
the EU acquis (i.e., legislation, policies and treaties) (Sutherland, 2017a). Domestically, the 
asymmetric, quasi-federal system of government saw the creation of devolved legislatures 
in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh, each with different and evolving powers, but unable to 
legislate on telecommunications or Internet access.7 Nonetheless, successive Scottish 
Ministers adopted policies, setting objectives for improving availability of services in rural 
areas (see Table 3), channelling state aid to operators, coordinating public procurement, 
supporting community action to improve digital skills, and transposing some minor planning 
legislation. However, the targets and state aid schemes came from HMG (see Table 2). 
 
                                                          
6 The yellow jersey for broadband is presently held by South Korea. 
7 See, for example, Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1999, section c3 of which excludes competition policy, while section 
c10 excludes telecommunications and wireless telegraphy. 
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Table 1:  European Union broadband targets 
Year Target 
 
2013 
 
Basic broadband for all citizens 
 
2020 
 
Speeds of 30 Mbps for all homes. 50% of homes having 100 Mbps or faster. (EC, 2010a) 
 
2025 
All schools, transport hubs, main providers of public services and digitally intensive 
enterprises to have 1 Gbps (EC, 2016b).  All urban areas as well as major roads and 
railways to have uninterrupted 5G wireless broadband coverage (EC, 2016g). 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Broadband targets set by Her Majesty’s Government 
Title Target 
Digital Britain 
(HMG, 2009) 
100% coverage by 2012, with minimum speed of 2 Mbps. 
90% coverage of Next Generation broadband (up to 40 Mbps) for 
homes and businesses by 2017. 
 
Britain’s superfast 
broadband future (BIS 
& DCMS, 2010) 
At least 2 Mbps for all. 
Superfast broadband (at least 24Mbps) to 90% of homes and 
businesses 
 
 
Queen’s Speech 
(HMG, 2016c) 
10 Mbps universal service obligation (USO). 
 
 
Superfast Broadband 
Programme (BDUK, 
2016) 
Basic broadband (2 Mbps) for all from December 2015.  
Superfast broadband (24 Mbps) to 90% by early 2016 and 95% by 
December 2017.  
 
The failure of its first independence referendum left the SNP unable to seize the ‘economic 
levers’, so that in the governance of telecommunications markets it was left with few 
mechanisms:  
● Procurement (e.g., Scottish Wide Area Network (SWAN, 2017)); 
● State aid; and  
● Persuasion of the British and European Union (EU) institutions. 
 
It is not clear that the, admittedly secretive, Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), has ever met 
to discuss telecommunications and Internet access, though Scottish Ministers have written 
to their UK counterparts. 
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Figure 1:  Outline of multi-level governance for telecommunications 
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Table 3:  Broadband policies of Scottish Ministers 
Title Target Actions 
Connecting 
Scotland 
(SE, 2001a) 
 To make affordable and pervasive broadband 
connections available to citizens and businesses  
 To ensure that every school has access to a rich 
online world in which it will be possible to 
communicate with others by text, voice or video; 
 To ensure that all parts of the health service can 
transfer data and use telemedicine as 
necessary. 
Demand aggregation and 
procurement in:  
 Highlands & Islands and  
 South of Scotland 
Digital 
inclusion 
strategy 
(SE, 2001b) 
 HMG and SE committed to achieving universal 
access to the Internet by 2005 
 As part of its Social Justice Strategy, to 
accelerate the number of households in 
disadvantaged areas with access to the Internet; 
 As part of its National Grid for Learning 
Programme (NGfL), to secure the benefits of 
advanced networked information technologies 
for education and lifelong learning. 
 A major campaign with HMG to 
raise the awareness of the 
benefits of getting online; 
 Increasing awareness of existing 
public access facilities; 
 increasing public access facilities; 
 Developing 2 pilot digital 
communities in disadvantaged 
areas 
Ambitions for 
the enterprise 
networks 
(SE, 2001c) 
 We want widespread digital connections to 
speed information flow around Scotland and 
back and forth between Scotland and the world. 
 Enterprise Networks to promote 
online business models;  
 Help ensure that all Scots benefit 
from emerging digital 
technologies. 
Digital 
inclusion in 
partnership 
(SE, 2006a) 
This renewed approach to tackling the digital 
divide will contribute to ensuring appropriate and 
effective support to partners delivering services, or 
providing access, and training to excluded groups 
Promoting and raising awareness of 
good practice, obligations and 
responsibilities within a range of 
practitioner networks 
 
Digital 
inclusion: 
Connecting 
Scotland’s 
people 
(SE, 2006b) 
A digitally-inclusive Scotland will ensure more 
equal, effective and beneficial access for all 
people to the digital technologies and Web 
facilities that benefit them in their day-to-day lives. 
In a digitally-inclusive Scotland, the public, private, 
and voluntary sectors will make positive use of 
digital technologies and the Web to improve 
quality of life and deliver new opportunities for 
disadvantaged individuals and communities. 
 
 Major campaign to raise 
awareness of the benefits of 
getting online; 
 Mapping and publishing the 
locations of all public access 
facilities; 
 Significantly increasing the 
number of venues offering public 
access; 
 Two pilot digital communities in 
disadvantaged areas. 
Digital 
Ambition for 
Scotland 
(SG, 2010a) 
 Next generation broadband will be available to 
all by 2020, and significant progress will be 
made by 2015; 
 Rate of broadband uptake should be at or above 
UK average by 2013, and should be highest of 
the UK nations by 2015. 
n/a 
Scotland's 
digital future 
(SG, 2011b) 
n/a  Various coordination and planning 
activities. 
Scotland’s 
digital future 
 (SG, 2012a) 
To deliver world-class, future proofed digital 
infrastructure across all of Scotland by 2020, with 
an interim milestone of delivering a step change 
by 2015 
 By 2015 speeds of 40-80 Mbps for 
between 85-90% of premises; 
 By 2020 world-class broadband; 
 
Programme 
for 
government 
(SG, 2016a) 
We are also investing in the digital infrastructure 
necessary to deliver next generation broadband to 
100% of premises – business and residential – 
across Scotland. 
 Launch delivery plan to reach 
100%;  
 Invest £90 million to deliver 
access to fibre optic broadband to 
95% of premises by end 2017; 
 A mobile programme to address 
gaps in 4G mobile coverage. 
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The complexity of governance of the United Kingdom broadband market and the reservation 
of legislative powers to Westminster limit the capacity of Scottish Ministers to intervene. 
However, this has not stopped them making promises of greater and universal access, even 
where they do not have the powers or resources to deliver, only partially sheltered by the 
undefinable term “world class” (Sutherland, 2017b). 
III Retail broadband services 
Broadband services, often bundled with broadcast and on-demand television programmes, 
have been welcomed by households. At the beginning of the decade Scotland had the lowest 
level of household adoption of the four ‘nations’ and, while it has caught up with Northern 
Ireland and Wales, it has yet to overtake England (see Figure 2).  Take-up of superfast 
broadband in Scotland is also lagging at 27%, compared to 31% for the UK. 
 
Figure 2:  Broadband take-up at home (OFCOM, 2016a, p. 4)  
 
There are two major providers of terrestrial broadband infrastructure, the UK-wide 
Openreach network, owned by BT, and the largely urban Virgin Media cable television 
network, owned by Liberty Global, plus a few smaller players with local footprints (e.g., B4RN 
(2016) and KCOM (2016)). In addition to this infrastructure-based competition, there is 
service-based competition amongst providers of retail broadband, using the BT Openreach 
local access network (see Table 4). The market is the United Kingdom, because providers 
mostly resell the wholesale Openreach offer and because they bundle it with video content 
that is licensed for the UK. Thus network and scale economies combine to make market entry 
difficult for local or infrastructure players. Arguably, this is a policy or regulatory failure, since 
it would have been possible to encourage and facilitate local infrastructure-based 
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competitors, for example, by ensuring the availability of backhaul from a number of local 
interconnection points. 
 
Table 4:  Broadband service providers  
Brand Ownership Comments 
BT BT Group 
plc 
Reselling Openreach offers, bundled with video content, including a 
significant sports selection. Also offers a bundle with its own mobile 
service. 
EE BT Group 
plc 
Primarily a mobile operator of 2, 3 and 4G wireless services, reselling 
Openreach DSL. Acquired by BT for £12.5 billion in 2015. 
Plusnet BT Group 
plc 
Founded in 1997 in Sheffield, floated on the Alternative Investment 
Market in July 2004, then acquired by BT in January 2007 
Sky8  Listed on 
LSE 
A satellite broadcasting, on-demand Internet streaming media, 
broadband and telephone services provider, with operations in the UK, 
Ireland, Germany, Austria and Italy. Formed by the merger of Sky TV 
and British Sky Broadcasting, plus a various satellite TV firms in the 
EU. Recently became an MVNO in the UK. 
Talk Talk Listed on 
LSE 
Founded in 2003 as a fixed telephony provider within the Carphone 
Warehouse group, then spun-off in March 2010. Suffered a severe 
cybersecurity failure, when hacked by a teenager, being fined for 
inadequate safety measures (BBC, 2016a; BBC, 2016b). 
Virgin 
Media 
Liberty 
Global 
Acquired by Liberty Global for USD 24 billion in 2013, the largest 
global cable company, with interests in a dozen countries. The result 
of mergers of a number of local cable television companies. 
Vodafone Listed on 
LSE 
Vodafone Group plc is a global mobile phone group, with interests in 
many countries, operating with 2, 3 and 4G technologies. Bundles 
mobile with fixed broadband in UK. 
Zen 
Internet 
Privately 
held 
Founded in 1995 in Rochdale, where it began offering services. Both 
retail and business services. 
 
By relying on regulated service-based competition, using real and virtual local loop 
unbundling (see Figure 3), BT has been allowed a significant say in the availability of new 
services and technologies, and of the pace of their deployment. For example, Vodafone 
challenged the rollout of services using the G.Fast standard, which delivers ‘up to’ 330 Mbps 
                                                          
8 Presently under offer from News Corp. 
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download on existing copper cables, seeking to have OFCOM control the Openreach 
technology migration path (Daws, 2016; FT, 2016). For more rural areas, where homes are 
further from exchanges, BT is conducting trials of ‘long reach’ VDSL in North Tolsta on the 
Long Isle (Fiveash, 2016). InNovember 2016, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced 
business rates relief for increased deployment of fibre into networks (HM Treasury, 2016). 
 
Figure 3:  Virtual unbundled local access (VULA) (Source: OFCOM) 
 
In more remote locations an alternative is satellite broadband (see Table 5). HMG offers a 
subsidy of at least £350 towards the installation costs in locations where the available 
terrestrial speed is less than 2 Mbps (Satellite Internet, 2016). These offer speeds close to 
superfast broadband, but remain unpopular. 
 
Table 5:  Ka-band satellite services  
Firm Satellite Position 
Eutelsat (Tooway brand)9 Eutelsat 10.0° E 
Avanti Communications 
Hylas 1 33.5°W 
Hylas 2 31.0°E 
SES Techcom 
Astra 2F 28.2°E 
Astra 3 23.5°E 
 
The decisions of HMG and the EU to pursue local loop unbundling and of OFCOM to strike 
the Openreach Agreement with BT created strong path dependencies in the governance and 
                                                          
9 http://www.broadbandwherever.net/support-schemes/free-broadband-for-scotland/ 
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structure of the retail market. Competition relies in large measure on the Openreach 
Agreement, which has been the subject of considerable lobbying and litigation, an enduring 
tussle between service providers and BT. OFCOM has strengthened its legal separation of 
Openreach, but rejected calls for it to require BT to spin it off (OFCOM, 2016d). In addition 
to OFCOM, the Advertising Standards Authority has been a vital regulator of advertised 
speeds, endeavouring to restrain misleading claims about prices and speeds (Futuresight, 
2015; ASA, 2016; GfK, 2016). 
IV Business connectivity 
While the bulk of broadband is retail, there is another market for the provision of connections 
to business premises, previously known as leased lines or partial private circuits (PPCs), 
now termed ‘business connectivity’. Providers connect commercial and government sites to 
virtual private networks (VPNs), Unified Communications as a Service (UCaaS), cloud 
services, and to the Internet. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) purchase these services on 
the European or global market, from a small group of network service providers (NSPs), 
which then build or lease any necessary local infrastructure (e.g., from BT or Colt) to reach 
the various premises of their customers.10 Mobile network operators are another major group 
of customers, connecting masts to base stations and then interconnecting them with 
exchanges, constructing their own infrastructure or leasing capacity from NSPs, notably: 
 BT 
 CityFibre 
 Colt 
 Level 3 
 Virgin Media 
 Vodafone 
 Verizon, and  
 Zayo 
The technologies used include dark or unlit fibre, wavelength-division multiplex (WDM), and 
Ethernet, plus some very old analogue services. Business connectivity is distinguished from 
household broadband by the provision of service level agreements (SLAs) that permit only 
very limited loss of connection and require the payment of penalties, necessitating backup 
facilities in anticipation of losses of any network components. 
 
 
                                                          
10 See, for example, the Gartner (2014) magic quadrant. 
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Figure 4:  Suppliers within 100 metres of business premises (OFCOM, 2016b, pp. 4, vol.1) 
 
In regulating business connectivity, OFCOM (2016b) distinguished four geographic markets, 
two for London and two for the rest of country (one being the city of Hull),  in each of which 
it measured competition in terms of the number of operators close to business premises and 
thus able to compete (see Figure 4). In central, but not peripheral, London it found sufficient 
competition to lift regulation, covering the provision of more than 30,000 leased lines. 
Elsewhere, the numbers of close competitors were much lower, so that it maintained 
regulation. OFCOM found the quality of the provision and repair of wholesale leased lines to 
be unacceptable, imposing minimum lead times on BT. It also created a voluntary code of 
practice for business broadband, clarifying the speeds offered by seven NSPs (OFCOM, 
2016c). OFCOM (2015c) addressed the needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), including the minority that was dissatisfied with the status quo (Jigsaw, 2014). One 
problem SMEs faced was the lack of superfast broadband, where there was concern that 
supply by BT had been constrained to avoid cannibalisation of leased lines revenues. 
There was only one response from Scotland to the consultation on business connectivity, in 
which the Scottish Futures Trust (SFT), a QUANGO, suggested that OFCOM investigate the 
“Scottish market” supplying rural SMEs. However, there are neither distinct markets for 
Scotland nor for rural SMEs, and SFT failed to produce any evidence to suggest that such 
markets exist. The creation of geographic markets for leased lines is a difficult task, with the 
risk of ending up in the impossible position of each premise in its own individual market (GAO, 
2007). Since the whole of Scotland and all the rural areas of the United Kingdom fall into a 
regulated zone, no purpose could be served in defining such markets. SFT did not explain 
what might be found amongst rural SMEs in Scotland. To argue for lower prices, SFT would 
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have to produce data to show the costs had been incorrectly calculated by OFCOM, while to 
argue for faster provisioning or repairs, it would have to show that BT was being unjustifiably 
dilatory. In both cases SFT would need to produce at least preliminary data to justify OFCOM 
taking action, which cannot be expected to engage in ill-defined ‘fishing expeditions’. Another 
possibility is that rural SMEs cannot afford the regulated price, in which case they would have 
to look to HMG or to Scottish Ministers for subsidies, similar to the voucher scheme for 
Superconnected Cities.  
In May 2016, the then Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and DCMS 
launched a joint inquiry into business broadband, in particular for SMEs and business parks 
(BIS & DCMS, 2016). The results of the consultation are apparently still being analysed 
(HMG, 2016a), in terms of the productivity plan of HM Treasury. The Autumn Statement 
indicated funds were being provided to support fibre networks to business parks, while 
OFCOM is improving access to ducts to support fibre deployments by NSPs (HM Treasury, 
2016; OFCOM, 2016e). 
The EC collects data on the use by businesses of ICTs. Figure 5 shows the level of adoption 
of fast broadband by businesses, with the United Kingdom scoring poorly. Figure 6 shows a 
breakdown by sector and by size of firms, where the United Kingdom is close to the EU 
average, further broken down in Figure 7 for the UK and EU, using NACE codes. Taken 
together, these suggest a poor level of adoption of fast Internet connections for businesses, 
both in general and in nearly all sectors. Comparable data for Scotland would be very useful, 
in order to assess the level of use of fast broadband and the pace of progress. It stands in 
strange contrast to the position of the United Kingdom as a leading digital economy (BMWi, 
2016), albeit at 17 per cent of its potential (McKinsey & Co, 2016). 
While much less prominent than the residential market, business connectivity is important for 
existing and future businesses. Although the Scottish Government may want it regulated 
differently, SFT failed to understand the process and thus did not provide the evidence that 
Scotland, rural Scotland or Scottish SMEs are different or to justify different regulatory 
remedies. The comparatively low levels of adoption of fast broadband in UK businesses, 
presumably including Scotland, are a cause for concern, though it is not obviously related to 
lack to availability. 
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Figure 5:  Enterprises with fast broadband connections in the EU and EEA (EC, 2016h)  
 
 
Figure 6:  Enterprises with fast fixed broadband connections by economic sector (EC, 2016i) 
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Figure 7:  Enterprises with fast fixed broadband connections by economic sector (EC, 
2016e) 
 
V Mobile broadband 
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(Curwen & Whalley, 2016a; 2016b). What had been five networks were reduced when: 
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 BT acquired EE (CMA, 2016); though 
 Three was blocked from acquiring O2 (Telefónica) (EC, 2016c). 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Manufacture: food, beverages, tobacco, textile, leather, wood,
paper; publishing and printing 10+
Manufacture: coke, petroleum, chemical, plastics, other non-
metallic mineral products 10+
Manufacture: computers, electric & optical, motor vehicles,
transport equipment, furniture, repair 10+
Electricity, gas, steam, air conditioning; water supply, sewerage,
waste management&remediation 10+
Manufacture: basic metals & fabricated metal products excluding
machines & equipments 10+
Construction 10+
Trade of motor vehicles and motorcycles 10+
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 10+
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 10+
Transport and storage 10+
Accommodation and food service activities 10+
Publishing activities; films & television, sound & music
publishing; broadcasting 10+
Telecommunications 10+
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities,
information services 10+
Real estate activities 10+
Professional, scientific and technical activities 10+
Administrative and support service activities 10+
Percentage
EU27
UK
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
107 
 
 
In advance of the auctions for spectrum for 4G networks, there was political pressure for 
improved rural coverage, including debates in the House of Commons. In response, OFCOM 
created one licence in the 800 MHz band with obligations to cover 98 per cent of the United 
Kingdom population, and 95 per cent of each of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales, potentially disadvantaging rural England (Sutherland, 2016). BT having demerged its 
mobile operations as O2 in 2001, re-entered the market first by buying spectrum in the 4G 
auctions and then acquiring EE. Some of the auctioned spectrum had been recovered 
through digital migration by the broadcasters, part of a complex battle over the respective 
claims of broadcasting and broadband (Harvey & Ala-Fossi, 2016). 
HMG intervened on rural coverage, firstly with the Mobile Infrastructure Project (MIP) and 
secondly with a public consultation on further measures. The MIP recognised the need to 
fund mobile network expansion in selected areas or ‘not spots’ (e.g., the A9 in Scotland), 
through a state aid scheme (EC, 2013a). It was to be built by Arqiva, a firm that constructs 
and manages infrastructure for a number of networks, but used by all operators (Stonadge, 
2015; Rathbone & Hirst, 2016). However, the minister later acknowledged the project had 
failed (Scroxton, 2016):  
We had not anticipated just how difficult some of the planning issues are, particularly when 
we were dragging four operators with us, metaphorically kicking and screaming. Although we 
were paying for the mast, we were asking them to meet the operating costs going forward, 
which includes the land rental as well as the transmission costs for what is, by definition, an 
uneconomic area. (Hansard, 2016) 
Of the £150 million budget, at the end of November 2015, the only spending had been 
(Hansard, 2015): 
 Site builds £0.9 million; 
 Site searches and acquisitions (including planning permission) £5.1 million; 
 Supplier management and programme management costs and one-off supplier 
deliverables £3 million. 
Some of the masts had to be 20-30 metres high, essential to provide sufficient coverage, to 
which the local communities they would serve had often objected. Additionally, some were 
in national parks or areas of outstanding national beauty, generating yet more objections. 
HMG consulted on means to improve coverage, identifying four options (DCMS, 2014a): 
 National roaming: phones would be able to use another network when their own was 
not available; 
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 Infrastructure sharing: networks would be able to use each other’s masts;  
 Reforming MVNOs: they would be enabled to offer services on all networks; and  
 Coverage obligations: operators would be obliged to cover a certain percentage of 
the country, but leaving them to select the means to do so. 
Before publication of the analysis of the responses, HMG struck a deal in which EE, O2, 
Three and Vodafone agreed they would (DCMS, 2014b; OFCOM, 2015b): 
 Invest £5 billion to improve infrastructure by 2017; 
 Provide voice and text coverage from each operator across 90 per cent of the UK 
geographic area by 2017, halving partial not-spots;11 
 Increase full coverage from 69 to 85 per cent of geographic areas by 2017; and  
 Provide reliable signal strength for voice for 2, 3 and 4G services. 
EE (now BT) won a contract for the Emergency Services Mobile Communications 
Programme (ESMCP), requiring it to build the emergency services network (ESN), by 
extending its mobile network to support ‘universal networking’ for the ‘blue light’ services 
(Home Office, 2015a; 2015b). This was intended to aid the delivery of wider public access to 
the EE mobile network and wholesale arrangements with rival networks, but has encountered 
delays and difficulties (Committee of Public Accounts, 2017). 
OFCOM reports regularly on the expanding coverage and use of the various generations of 
mobile telecommunications. With the transition to 4G and improved coverage, customers 
have been making much greater use of smartphones (see Figure 8 and Figure 9). It has 
launched an ‘app’ to allow individuals to collect anonymous data on network availability and 
performance. The UK National Infrastructure Commission (2016) has suggested the need 
for significant work to prepare for 5G, accepted in part by the Chancellor. 
The mobile network operators are consolidating down to a smaller number, a process that 
may not be finished. The economics of network construction in rural areas remain 
unattractive, a combination of low population density, high backhaul costs and the limited 
availability of lower frequency spectrum. The operators are reluctant to build networks 
covering the most remote parts of the United Kingdom without support from HMG. 
 
 
                                                          
11 These are locations where one or two networks are available and was to be resolved by sharing of masts, towers and 
other infrastructure by the operators not yet present at a site. 
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Figure 8:  Use of a mobile phone to access the web (OFCOM, 2016a) 
 
 
Figure 9:  Outdoor 4G premises mobile coverage by operators (OFCOM, 2016a)  
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further complication has been the need to upgrade networks, where there may already be 
infrastructure, but offering only the slower speeds of a previous technological generation. 
HMG has struggled with the broadband state aid rules. The rural scheme was delayed and 
had to be renegotiated, while the Superconnected Cities project had to be converted from 
network construction to vouchers for businesses, following a complaint it was overbuilding 
an existing network in Birmingham.  
 
Figure 10:  Funding for BDUK projects in Scotland (McGrath, 2016) 
 
The rural state aid scheme was developed by Broadband United Kingdom (BDUK), part of 
the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).12 In England the money was 
channelled to ‘local bodies’ (i.e. groups of local authorities), which added EU money, before 
tendering for contracts, won by BT. Elsewhere it was to devolved administrations, with 
Scottish Ministers creating two projects (see Figure 10). The first routed through Highlands 
and Islands Enterprise (HIE) and the second managed by the Scottish Government. In order 
to reach some of the remoter locations, it was necessary to lay 19 undersea cables. The 
scheme was calculated on a rate of adoption that was frequently exceeded, triggering a 
clawback clause, allowing further extensions to the network. 
 
Scottish Ministers also found £2.5million for experimental projects under the Community 
Broadband Scotland (CBS, 2016) scheme (see Table 6). 
 
 
                                                          
12 It had been part of the BIS Department, but transferred following remarks by the then BIS Secretary about a merger 
case he had to adjudicate. 
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Table 6:  Community broadband Scotland schemes (CBS, 2016)  
Location Project 
Ewes Valley  
(Dumfries & 
Galloway) 
A small rural community not able to receive standard broadband service due 
to distance from the serving BT exchange. 
Tomintoul & 
Glenlivet (Moray)  
Remote, inland mountain communities in the Cairngorm National Park, too 
remote from many services. 
Elvanfoot  
(South 
Lanarkshire) 
A community at an advanced stage in their broadband plans and with scope to 
provide a service to a neighbouring community.  Community has combined 
with nine other area villages and formed B4GAL - broadband for Glencaple 
and Lowther.  Potential access to funding from area renewable energy projects. 
Colonsay  
(Argyll & Bute) 
An island with a small population. Local group has identified improved 
broadband provision as a key component for supporting development and 
retaining population. 
Corgarff & 
Glenbuchat 
(Aberdeenshire) 
Small dispersed settlements within glens at the edge of the Cairngorms, 
remote from BT exchanges, with many residents relying on satellite broadband. 
Applecross  
(Highland)  
A remote coastal community with a small population, heavily dependent on 
tourism. Users were unable to exceed 0.5Mbps on conventional broadband, 
with no service on the north coast. 
The state aid activities in Scotland were conducted under a BDUK umbrella approval from 
the EC, with money from HM Treasury, both direct and via Barnett consequential funds, plus 
EU funds. While these projects are in Scotland, it is far from clear that they can otherwise be 
called Scottish. Indeed, the proposals presently being prepared by the Scottish Government 
for its Reaching 100% (R100) project appear to be the funds clawed back from BT and 
matched with EU funds.  
 
VII Adoption 
In May 2010 the then Coalition Government took the unusual step of retaining the services 
of the UK Digital Champion, appointed by Gordon Brown the previous June. The digital 
inclusion tsar and the associated charity (Race Online 2012, later rebranded Go On UK) 
were to encourage those not yet using the Internet to do so, both to boost economic growth 
and to assist the government save money by preparing citizens for online transactions. Such 
was her success that she was made Baroness Lane-Fox of Soho, while the European 
Commission encouraged other EU member states to make similar appointments (EC, 2016f). 
The UK government launched a Digital Inclusion Charter in April 2014, aiming to reduce by 
one quarter the number of people offline by 2016 and that by 2020 everyone who “can be 
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digitally capable” would be. This involved public and private sectors, with voluntary, 
community and social enterprise (VCSE) organisations, notably the Tinder Foundation (now 
Good Things Foundation) and Go On UK, overseen by a Digital Inclusion Delivery Board 
(HMG, 2014b). This work supported the initiative for ‘digital by default’ services across 
government. 
The Scottish Government opted out of this voluntary and unfunded initiative, waiting until 
2011 to adopt a charter signed together with leading technology firms to boost digital 
adoption, though with little, if any, apparent effect (SG, 2011a).  In parallel, public libraries 
were offering free, if limited, access and training (SLIC, 2015). The policy changed in 2014, 
with work subcontracted to the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO, 2016), 
and the creation of a Digital Participation Programme. To date, no report or statistics have 
been published.  
Scottish Ministers distanced themselves from the initiatives of HMG and Lane-Fox, though 
without any explanation or provision of an obviously superior alternative. Their delays appear 
to have contributed to the lower adoption rates and thus to the failure to deliver the goal of 
higher adoption rates than other parts of the United Kingdom. The aspiration of Scottish 
Ministers to be world class requires nearly universal adoption, yet the scope of those still 
excluded or refusing to participate has been poorly surveyed. Consequently, there cannot be 
evidence-based policy, forcing Scottish Ministers to fall back on ideology and copying others.  
VIII Urban case study: Glasgow 
In 2010, OFCOM reported that only half the homes in the Glasgow, Clyde and Lanarkshire 
‘region’ had installed broadband, compared to 76 per cent for the United Kingdom; a level 
substantially below a range of British cities. Since Greater Glasgow accounts for more than 
ten per cent of the population, this significantly depressed the overall adoption rate for 
Scotland, presenting a challenge to achieving the highest level of the four nations (SG, 
2010b). There was no immediate explanation of the poor performance, nor why it was seen 
across all socio-economic and age groups (OFCOM, 2012, p. 16). While the level has since 
risen, recent progress has been by an atypically heavy dependence on and sharp upturn in 
access to mobile broadband, surprisingly amongst the over 65s. 
The Carnegie Trust commissioned 200 face-to-face interviews (White, 2013), finding two 
offline groups (see Figure 11), requiring different strategies; those interested in going online 
in the future and those who expressed no interest. Amongst the barriers to digital participation 
were the attractions of the offline world, fear of certain aspects of trying to go online, low 
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levels of trust in technology, the cost, illiteracy and vicarious use, through family and friends. 
Low adoption rates were also thought to exist in Inverclyde and Ayrshire.  
 
Figure 11:  Barriers to Internet access, by potential users and rejecters (White, 2013, p. 19)  
 
One solution to the lack of residential access has been public facilities, primarily the 33 
libraries, the result of historical work by the Carnegie Foundation and the former Glasgow 
Corporation. Today, these are operated by Culture and Sport Glasgow, an arm’s length 
external organisation (ALEO), under the brand ‘Glasgow Life’ (2015). The installation of 
computers for Internet and Wi-Fi access was supported by the United Kingdom National 
Lottery, though there were continuing challenges in maintaining staff skills and equipment, in 
line with advances in technology. A survey of those using libraries for Internet access found 
a strong geographic effect, tending to be those living nearby, suggesting the need for more 
libraries or comparable facilities, and also for greater capacity in the libraries (Anderson & 
Whalley, 2015). Glasgow Life had taken a “passive approach” to meeting demands that were 
growing in sophistication and volume, rather than seeking to understand the motivations of 
their users. There were two key activities, driven by the HMG (2016b) ‘digital by default’ 
strategy, requiring Internet access to:  
 Apply for Universal Credit; and  
 Generate evidence of having searched for jobs.  
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Figure 12:  Fixed broadband adoption levels in Glasgow13 
 
This led providers of social housing to consider installing broadband access. For example, 
the Wheatley Group (2016) undertook pilot projects to develop a model for low cost 
broadband for its tenants, but switched to a partnership with Glasgow Kelvin College to 
create thirty ‘Click & Connect’ computer learning centres for tenants. Coordination is 
performed by the Glasgow Digital Participation Group, including the City Council and 
Glasgow Housing Association (GHA). 
The new Glasgow Economic Strategy aims to make it “the most productive major city in the 
UK”, requiring it to overcome significant underperformance, especially with respect to 
continental European cities. Additionally, the ICT sector is a major economic sector, 
generating £480 million gross value added (GVA) and employing 26,350 in 2014, which: 
We will expand on our position as the number one digital city in Scotland by increasing the 
number of people with digital skills, growing our business base and more effectively 
marketing our digital success (Glasgow City Council, 2016, p. 6).  
It had previously set out the objective that: 
Glasgow will be a world leading digital city by 2017 securing and growing the competitive 
advantage of the city and providing opportunities for residents and businesses to embrace 
the benefits of the digital age (Glasgow City Council, 2014). 
In January 2013 Glasgow City Council won £24 million from the UK Technology Strategy 
Board, for a Future Cities Demonstrator project. Then the City Deal with HMG and 
                                                          
13 The original source is the British Population Survey, reported by OFCOM in its annual Communications Market 
Reports. 
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surrounding local authorities provided funding for infrastructure, including digital 
infrastructure and part of the Smart City project (Glasgow City Region, 2016). The City 
Council and BT offered a ‘free’ Wi-Fi service in public places, initially for the 2014 
Commonwealth Games,14 with a similar service on many buses, railway stations and trains.15 
In parallel, railway and travel apps were made available for smartphones, while some 
operators sell electronic tickets. 
Recently, there has been an improvement in broadband adoption rates in Glasgow, with a 
sharp rise in the number of smartphones (see Figure 13), even more remarkably this appears 
to be generated by the over 65s, though this may be ownership rather than use (see Figure 
14). If this increase is repeated in 2017 it will be truly unusual.  
 
Figure 13:  Fixed broadband and mobile adoption in Glasgow (OFCOM, 2016a, p. 19) 
 
Glasgow was found to have slower download speeds than comparable cities in the United 
Kingdom, though these had risen from 7 to 15 Mbps, between September 2009 and 
December 2014 (Gijón, Whalley, & Anderson, 2016). Those living in more deprived areas 
experienced slower speeds compared to more affluent neighbourhoods, which might reflect 
greater investment where higher adoption rates had been expected (see Figure 9). However, 
there were also engineering problems, such as exchange only lines (EOLs) and some 
aluminium wiring.16 A further factor could be infrastructure competition with Virgin Media, 
pushing Openreach to upgrade its network in specific areas. 
 
                                                          
14 BT uses its street furniture (e.g., payphones) to allow its broadband customers to log into Wi-Fi. 
15 HMG provided subsidies under the Superconnected Cities initiative for buses and trams in Edinburgh (DCMS, 2015). 
16 EOLs lack the street cabinets that are otherwise upgraded to fibre to provide superfast speeds. 
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Figure 14:  Broadband adoption in Glasgow, over 65 years (OFCOM, 2016a, p. 20; 2015d, 
p. 28) 
 
 
 
Figure 15:  Broadband by home ownership and tenancy in Scotland (SG, 2016b, p. 137) 
 
The ‘Glasgow effect’ of excess mortality in public health has received considerable and 
continuing research, with death rates having diverged noticeably from the United Kingdom 
average, failing to match improvements achieved elsewhere (Walsh, Bendel, Jones, & 
Hanlon, 2010; Reid, 2011). A further comparison is available from economic migrants and 
refugees, whose health has been gradually declining, as they become acculturated and as 
the effects of deprivation in the areas in which the live become evident (Kearns, Whitley, 
Egan, Tabbner, & Tannahill, 2016). Something more than “just deprivation” has been seen 
to be at work in Glasgow, potentially including: 
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● Climate; 
● Culture;  
● Genetics; 
● Politics; and  
● Socio-economic factors. 
After controlling for deprivation, the mortality disadvantage has worsened, as has 
psychological morbidity, death from cancers and chronic liver disease, with inadequate intake 
of fruit and vegetables, and a lack of physical activity pervasive across socio-economic 
groups. There has been an insidious accumulation of relatively minor, but pervasive and 
persistent causes of stress that, taken together, offer the “most parsimonious explanation” 
for the poor health outcomes and morbidity (Cowley, Kiely, & Collins, 2016).  
The work in public health points to methodologies for identifying underlying causes of 
broadband adoption and rejection at low levels of aggregation. However, it also identifies 
differences in behaviour, communications, culture, social capital and the stresses of daily life 
that are common to both health problems and the lower levels of broadband adoption. A 
somewhat disturbing possibility, from a study advocating increased physical activity to 
counter the effects of systemic stress, is that efforts to increase the adoption of broadband 
Internet access might reduce levels of physical activity, worsening morbidity, with one quarter 
of adults in Scotland reporting they too much time online (OFCOM, 2016a, p. 12).  
 
IX Conclusion 
Scottish Ministers have high political aspirations for broadband, but lack the means to 
implement them, being almost entirely reliant on Brussels (until Brexit) and London (until 
independence), something they have been loath to admit. The decision by HMG to switch 
rural network extension from state aid to cross-subsidies between users of the broadband 
network removes their role from the BDUK scheme, though its final phase is being rebranded 
Reaching 100% (R100 ) in Scotland, but which duplicates and clashes with the UK universal 
service obligation, which has its own, somewhat obscure payment mechanism, with funds 
moving from urban to rural consumers, under the oversight of OFCOM. Scottish Ministers 
should have been sending political requests to HMG and techno-economic analyses to 
OFCOM in support of their socio-economic policy goals, rather than rebranding commitments 
made in London. However, it is necessary to recognise the importance of path dependency, 
especially of Openreach, and the slowness with which change can be made to the regulatory 
system. 
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Scottish Ministers made their 100 per cent coverage commitment without any costing or 
impact assessment. Moreover, it would neither deliver “world class” infrastructure, being only 
24 Mbps, nor would it be “any time, any place, anywhere”, being only inside premises. The 
limits of their ambitions were highlighted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is pushing 
for fibre to the home and to the business park, as well as for 5G mobile, while the EC is 
pushing for a Gigabit society. Aspirations to being “world class” must be judged on market 
structures and systems of governance (Sutherland, 2017b), rather than infrastructure, which, 
unlike roads or sewers, are constantly evolving, with even optical fibre undergoing significant 
technological advances (Lord, Soppera, & Jacquet, 2016). 
The problem of poor productivity in the United Kingdom is well established. The argument by 
both the Chancellor and the Glasgow City Council is that broadband offers a tool to improve 
productivity, but requires training of individuals and an understanding of both adoption and 
non-adoption by businesses. Low levels of business use of fast broadband suggest 
significant problems. 
The Brexit referendum brought uncertainty, since the legislative and policy framework for the 
United Kingdom telecommunications market has been deeply embedded in the European 
Union for decades. Ceasing to be a member state means no longer having a voice in the 
future regulation of the single market, indeed at the time of writing it is unclear what sort of 
access firms based in the United Kingdom will have to that market. HMG will, once Brexit is 
complete, have a free hand to review laws and to determine policies for the sector, with an 
obvious incentive for the established operators to lobby for an easier regime, with few 
organised voices to oppose them. The position in Scotland is yet more complex, with talk of 
a second independence referendum opening up a range of scenarios, of the possible splitting 
of the existing United Kingdom telecommunications networks and markets, of the need to 
create new institutions for their governance, which might or might not have to be in 
compliance with the EU acquis, perhaps both at different times. Existing operators would be 
required to carve out their Scottish operations, if only for accounting and regulatory purposes. 
They might also be tempted to spin off those businesses, perhaps to hedge funds or to local 
groups, those better able to negotiate a new set of regulations in a new country. 
There are a number of areas for further research, not least in tracking events around Brexit, 
a second Scottish independence plebiscite and technological advances. The issue of 
broadband being a strategic necessity and the consequent need to track global 
developments should be examined. An analysis of the costs and benefits of broadband by 
sector, emphasising leading sectors of the Scottish economy would be beneficial. 
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